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ABSTRACT 
The conversion of coal into other types of fuel 
through gasification and liquefaction has been proposed 
as a means of coping with America's increasing energy 
needs. Coal conversion plants require large quantities 
of water for cooling purposes and for use as a raw material. 
There are three types of water allocation presently 
used in the United States, riparianism, prior appropriation, 
and administrative permit systems. The common law riparian 
system is undesirable because under it water rights are in-
secure and subject to locational use restrictions. Prior 
appropriation is better, but the permanent water right 
created under this system results in excessive rigidity. 
A system of administrative regulation by means of a con-
sumptive use permit system offers the best allocation frame-
work for both coal conversion facilities and other water 
users as well. 
Kentucky presently has such a system of administrative 
allocation. However, this legislation could be improved by 
(1) clarifying the planning functions of the Department 
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection and the 
Water Resources Authority; (2) expanding the scope of the 
consumptive use permit system by removing most of the ex-
empted use categories; (3) adopting beneficial use as the 
basis upon which consumptive use permits will be granted; 
(4) imposing a durational limit on water use permits and 
delineating renewal procedures; (5) adopting a scheme for 
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both voluntary and involuntary transfers of water rights; 
and (6) specifying more explicit provision for dealing 
with temporary water shortages. 
Finally, it should be noted that the federal govern-
ment has an important role with respect to navigation, water 
resources development, and water pollution control. Fed-
eral powers in these areas may impose some constraints on 
state allocation policies, although major conflicts can 
be avoided if proper coordination among state and federal 
officials is maintained. 
Descriptors: 
* * Legal Aspects, Legislation, Water Law, Water Policy, 
Water Resources Development 
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r. coal Conversion and Water Resources. 
A. Energy Needs and Proposed Solutions 
Until recently, the United States was able to supply 
through domestic sources almost 90 percent of its total 
energy demands, thus insuring virtual self-sufficiency. 1 
since 1971, however, energy demands have continually ex-
ceeded domestic production and the United States has relied 
on foreign suppliers to make up the difference. 2 In 1973 
an oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
countries (OPEC) demonstrated the extent of America's de-
pendence upon foreign energy sources. 
Both the availability and cost of energy greatly 
affect a society's standard of living. 3 The Arab embargo 
of October 1973 lasted only a short time, but the Federal 
Energy Administration reported that while "massive unem-
ployment, blackouts and other major disruptions were a-
voided, the embargo still had an appreciable impact." 
It is estimated that the GNP dropped by $10 to $20 billion 
during the embargo, and about 500,000 workers consequently 
lost their jobs. Moreover, about a third of the 9.8 percent 
increase in consumer prices that year was due to higher 
world oil prices. 4 
Realizing the potential economic and social costs of 
increased dependence on foreign sources of energy, the 
President established a goal of energy independence for the 
U ' 5 nited States by 1985. ''Project Independence 1985'' is a 
long-range response to the Arab action and consists of ''a 
2 
series of plans and goals set to insure that by the end of 
this decade Americans will not have to rely on any source of 
6 
energy beyond our own." A policy of energy independence for 
America will doubtlessly require the development of new energy 
sources; but while this may .ultimately provide a long-term 
solution to the energy problem, more efficient use of existing 
resources such as coal, petroleum, natural gas or nuclear 
energy is also necessary, particularly in the short run. 
Unfortunately, immediate large-scale increases in the 
use of oil, natural gas, or nuclear energy involve problems 
of their own. Domestic petroleum and natural gas production 
cannot meet current or future demand. Even though there are 
large supplies of petroleum in this country, they are not 
sufficient to keep pace with the potential demand, and to raise 
production to higher levels by 1985 would involve prodigious 
7 
exploration and development costs. These development efforts 
would not be economically possible unless crude oil prices 
remain high. 
Increased reliance on natural gas would create even 
greater difficulties. The shortage of natural gas in the 
United States has become more acute in the last two or three 
years and now exceeds ten percent of total demands. This is not 
a result of a shifting of demands to natural gas due to the Arab 
oil embargo. Rather, it is a continuous and systematic long-
term shortage, which probably will not be eased appreciably 
as long as the Federal Power Commission retains its present , 
regulatory policy. 8 Proven reserves of natural gas have steadilYI i 
-----------------------------------· 
3 
declined in the last several years, and production at present 
prices will not be able to cover anticipated demand. 9 
At the present time ''nuclear and coal-fired electricity 
remain the only margins against rising energy demand that 
are under domestic control."lO The development of new 
nuclear energy sources entails high capital costs and long 
construction lead times, and in any event, nuclear generated 
electricity cannot always be substituted for gas or oii. 11 
Although the rapid, short-term expansion of coal production, 
may be difficult or costly, coal offers the best possibility 
under proven, present technology of some measure of energy 
self-sufficiency. 12 
In the first place, coal in place is relatively abundant. 
According to the Bureau of Mines, America's coal reserves 
amount to 1,600 billion tons. If coal use increases steadily 
to 50 percent by 2000, total consumption in the entire period 
from 1974 to 2000 would amount to about 70 billion tons, or 
four and one-half percent of known reserves. Exhaustion of 
reserves would be roughly 100 years away in 2000, even if the 
use continued to increase at a steady rate. 13 Moreover, these 
abundant coal reserves can be used to create synthetic fuels, 
primarily through gasification and liquefaction processes. 14 
B. Coal Conversion Technology 
Most coal conversion processes produce either gaseous 
or liquid fuels. The former process is known as gasification 
while the latter is called liquefaction. 
4 
1. Gasification 
The most promising of the modern processes for converting 
coal into another form of energy is coal gasification - the act 
of converting coal into synthetic natural gas (SNG). In the 
past, true natural gas coming straight out of the ground has 
been used in preference to SNG. since it was both plentiful 
and inexpensive. In the years following World War II the 
amount of natural gas used annually drastically increased, 
and it has continued to grow even to the present day. However, 
with increased usage has come a decrease in reserves, even a 
shortage in some areas, and with that, higher prices. All of 
this places increased importance on the idea of converting coal 
into SNG. If the coal produced SNG can replace regular natural 
gas in most applications, then technology will provide all the 
advantages of gas produced energy coupled with the material 
abundance of U.S. coal reserves. 
The basic process of coal gasification is to alter the 
chemical state of the basic mineral in such a manner that 
gaseous by-products are produced. Coal in its natural state 
is organic matter composed mainly of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, 
sulfur and nitrogen, as well as small amounts of various 
other minerals. 15 In coal the natural hydrogen content is 
16 
about 5% as opposed to a 75% carbon content. High-quality 
pipeline gas, however, contains about 25% hydrogen. 17 Thus, I 
"in order to convert coal to gas or liquid fuels, either 
carbon must be removed or hydrogen added to the coal molecule; 
precursors of pollutants, such as sulfur, must be converted 
to removable compounds, and undesirable inorganic matter 
------------------------------· 
5 
The hydrogen-adding methods are usually used, 
ince the carbon removing processes (such as by pyolysis) are 
also because hydrogen is required to 
nitrogen, and sulfur found in coal into 
eompounds that allow such substances to be removed from the 
produced. 19 
The beginnings of the modern processes of coal gasification 
the old-style gasification techniques of the early 
The first coal gas company began operating in London, 
in 1812 and in less than four years a similar company 
producing coal gas in the United States. 20 At this time 
procedure used to convert coal into gas energy was known 
as "destructive distillation", and consisted of heating the 
coal (in the absence of air) to a temperature where it de-
composed chemically. The gas produced form such distillation 
21 had a heating value of from 475 to 560 BTU. per cubic foot, 
compared with true natural gas, on the other hand, has a 
22 
value of from 980 to 1035 BTU. Moreover, the dis-
process leaves 70% or more of the coal as a solid 
creating additional problems. 23 
Early gasification procedure took the distillation process 
step further and avoided the disadvantages of the former 
As in the case of destructive distillation, the 
was heated and some gas was extracted in this manner. Then, 
a second step, the carbon residue of the heated coal was 
to either air, oxygen or steam (or various combinations 
the three) depending upon the type of by-product desired. 
6 
The gasses removed in this step were of generally lower 
heating value than the methane produced by distillation (from 
110 to 300 BTU per cubic foot as compared to 475 to 550 BTU 
per cubic foot. Because of this, and because distilled methane 
has only about one-half of the heating value of modern pipe-
line gas (with a heating value of over 1000 BTU. per cubic 
foot), some addition refinements were needed before coal 
gasification could become a viable alternative to natural gas 
at that time. 
At this point, modern gasification procedure adds yet 
another step, At the present time it seems that this third 
step is likely to take one of two forms. The first of these 
forms is the process known as methanation, which involves 
passing the secondary gas over a special nickel catalyst to 
convert it into almost pure methane. So far, however, the 
methanation step has not been used on a commercial scale. 24 
The second method of increasing the gasses formed during the 
second state of the gasification process into SNG with the high 
heating values of natural gas is known as hydrogasification. In 
this process, more economically promising than methanation, coal 
or char is reacted directly with hydrogen to form methane by 
feeding a mixture of hydrogen and steam into the hydrogasifier, 25 { 
as previously stated, hydrogasification may utilize the excess 
carbon left over from a first stage distillation (the char) . 26 
At the present time, seven major processes are used in the 
United States to convert coal to pipeline quality 
five processes are used to convert coal to liquid 
gas, while 
27 fuels. j 
I-f 
&; 
i l! 
\fy 
------------------------------· 
7 
.i;rhere are also several more conversion processes on the drawing 
these are completely untested at the present time. 
to be gained by examining each of the seven major 
processes individually, for all have many factors in common. 
,,'l'he typical coal conversion process begins by crushing the coal 
to a fine size, and usually oxydizing it to destroy any natural 
properties. Coking coal tends to cake when exposed to 
heat, and if this should happen, gasification would be 
to take place. The coal is then devolatilized (heated 
the absense of air so that it decomposed chemically - also 
as destructive distillation or pyrolysis) to produce some 
immediately. The char (solid residue) left from this 
then gasified by combining it with steam and oxygen to 
a secondary, or synthesis, gas. This gas then leaves 
the gasifiers and is treated by means of water scrubbers and 
oentifugal separators to remove tar, dust, ash and carbon im-
purities.28 The gas is then passed over a catysyst, which in-
creases the hydrogen to carbon monoxide ratio and speeds up 
shift conversion reaction. The gas is then purified 
all but the carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen (H 2 ) 
compounds, which are then methanated to produce pipeline 
quality gas (the process of gydrogasification still being in 
development). 
Unfortunately, none of the methanation procedures has yet 
commercially feasible. 29 At the present time there are 
two commercially available gasification procedures, the 
30 process and the Koppers-Totzek process. They both work 
the principle described above and both result in "producer 
8 
gas" (gas too inefficient to be transmitted very far by 
pipeline but which is often used by industry near the coal 
conversion site) as a final product. There an additional 
methanation process would be necessary before this gas would 
serve as a substitute for natural gas. The first application 
of this latter step has been proposed for an existing Lurgi 
facility in the San Juan Basin of New Mexico. In addition to 
the existing commercial processes, several others are in the 
developmental states, among these being Bi-gas (Bituminous 
Coal Research, Inc.) co 2 Acceptor Process (Consolidation 
Coal Co.) and the Hygas Process (Institute of Gas Technology). 
At the present time, Hygas is considered to be the most promisi~ 
of all the process being currently developed, even though 
the Lurgi process has seen extensive use. 
Coal gasification is not without its problems, Even if 
technical difficulties in the conversion process itself can be 
overcome, synthetic gas cannot economically compete at the 
present time with natural g·as. Moreover, some systems involve 
high maintenance costs while a lack of sufficient sources of 
electrical power, oxygen and hydrogen may hamper the development 
of others. 31 Environmental factors are also a source of concern, 
particularly in the area of water use. 
All of the proposed processes are going to require huge 
amounts of water. As the Institute for Mining and Minerals 
Research of the University of Kentucky reported, " [a] 11 
gasification schemes require large volumes of water for hydrogen 
production. Large amounts of water are also needed for process 
-----------------------------· 
9 
Therefore, a natural water supply in large amounts 
available at 11 . 32 a times. Indeed, the two most important 
in determining the location of the conversion plant are 
amounts of local coal reserves and the availability of a 
33 
supply of water, The methanation reaction produces 
amounts of heat (94,200 BTU./lb mole) which must be 
disipated in order to prevent catalyst deactivation and 
f<t·m1 -aw·av" conditions. 
34 The most effective way to dissipate 
heat may be to use a "fluid-bed" type reactor for the 
methanation process, which would entail an additional intake 
35 
water. 
The Lurgi methanation process being built in New Mexico 
serve as an example. Projected water requirements for 
this facility include a primary water intake of 7,000 gallons 
36 per minute (gpm) to be gathered from outside sources. This 
water requirement figure is exclusive of the approximately 
765 gpm that will be taken in the form of moisture in the coal 
and the 630 gpm that will be produced by the methanation re-
t . 37 ac ion. In terms of annual consumption the plant will use 
approximately 17 million cubic meters of water a year, but 
this figure is misleading since the New Mexico facility ''is 
engineered so that only 15 percent of gross cooling require-
ment is met by evaporative cooling. In other areas and under 
other conditions water consumption might be considerably higher. 38 
There are four factors which determine the amount of water 
used in the gasification process. First, the amount of water 
reused must be considered, second, the type of fuel used for 
firing the boilers is important, third, the means of cooling 
Utilized is a significant factor, and lastly, the type and 
10 
composition (especially moisture and sulfur content) of the 
feed coal must be considered. Thus, for example, where the 
coal used is low grade lignite, it has been estimated that the 
"gasification of one ton [i;if lignite] ... consumes about 
3.5 tons of water. A plant built to gasify 8.5 million tons 
per year of lignite would require 30 million tons per year of 
39 
water or 22,000 acre-feet.'' According to one report" •.. water 
consumption in coal gasification plants producing pipeline gas 
of 250 million scf per day (7 million m3 per day) capacity can 
be expected to range from about 10,000 acre-ft (12 million m3 ) 
per year where water is at a premium to 45,000 acre-ft (55 
million m3 ) per year where abundant but poor quality water is 
used for cooling. The principle difference are in evaporative 
cooling requirement and relate to the extent to which air 
cooling is employed and greater waste-water disposal where 
input water is of low quality.•• 40 Thus, it must be concluded 
that coal gasification requires large volumes of water under 
any set of conditions. 
2. Coal Liquefaction 
The second major process for converting coal into other 
more useable forms of energy is the process of liquefaction, 
Although f ;;,; which is the conversion of coal into liquid fuel oil. 
the work on coal-to-oil conversion lags behind the coal 
i 
I gasification effort at this time, 41 coal liquefaction could be 
an extremely important tool in the satisfaction of America's I 
future energy needs. Although the technique of coal liquefactionl i0 i 
is not as highly developed as is that of coal gasification - makil I, 
I 
,i I I I 
.... _________________________ • 
11 
accurate projections risky - it has been estimated that a 
typical liquefaction plant, consuming about 30,000 tons of 
.coal a day, would be able to produce about 100, 000 barrels 
synthetic crude per day. 42 Should such a system prove 
the economic and environmental advantages would be 
In the first place, the low cost, domestically 
could be applied to existing oil-run power plants 
\(which must now rely on a percentage of foreign produced 
>supplies) without the expense of converting the plant to 
coal burning one. In addition, "an electric utility is 
to find it much easier to use a low-sulfur fuel 
from coal rather than operating a complicated chemical 
processing step included in any gas stack cleaning system. 
This is particularly true of the eastern United States where 
power demands are high and substantially all of the coal is 
of the high-sulfur variety.• 43 
As was the case with gasification, the technology necessary 
the conversion of coal to oil is not a recent discovery. 
Such knowledge was available in Europe over 30 years ago, but 
time the process was commercially unfeasible. 44 The 
of coal liquefaction is in itself relatively simple, 
·Andis actually just one step further removed from coal gas-
. ification. Stated simply, " [t] he ratio of carbon to hydrogen 
much higher in coal then in oil; coal liquification involves 
hydrogen from coal by a gasification process and 
it with coal so as to increase the hydrogen content 
the coal and produce an oii.• 45 
12 
At the present time there are two basic plant types which 
are producing a liquid fuel from coal. These are the COED 
(Char-Oil-Energy-Development) plant operating in New Jersey 
since 1962 and the CSF (Consol Synthetic Fuel)plant in West 
V
. . . 46 1.rg 1.n1.a. Several other processes exist at the present time 
but it appears that COED and CSF are the most promising for 
long-term use . In the COED process the coal is broken down 
into oil. . "by exposing it to progressively hotter 
temperatures in several different chambers. The coal is placed 
in a fluidized bed where the particles of coal are so small 
that they behave like a fluid when placed in a rapid, up-
ward-moving stream of air. The process produces a 
tacklike "oil" (which must be treated with hydroge:1 to remove 
the sulfur and make it more liquid.•• 47 The CSF project, 
however, works on a very different principle. In this process 
pulverized coal is first dissolved, and an extract from this 
chemical reaction is recovered by the use of filters.
48 
This 
solvent is then distilled and further processed (catalytically 
hydrogenated) in order to produce an even heavier solvent for 
the production of the synthetic oi1.
49 
Although the liquefaction of coal ''requires considerably 
less process water then that required for gasification due to 
the much lower hydrogen-carbon ratios involved, it is none-
theless clear that large amounts of water will be necessary 
50 
if this project is to be carried on in large scale, For 
example, a COED plant will need large supplies of water for 
boiler feed water, cooling tower make-up water, and emergency 
steam. 51 
13 
an independent study the Bureau of Mines estimated a con-
¢ption of 17,000 acre-feet per year for each 100,000 bbl/day 
produced. 52 It has also been reported that ". • [t] he 
Petroleum Council (1973) adopted a unit consumptive-use 
0.2 acre-ft (247m3 ) per year per bpd capacity. 53 Until 
better data becomes available, this figure translates into 20,000 
per year for 100,000 barrels per day of oil. 54 This 
of 20,000 AF/yr per 100,000 bbl/day is also the "rule-
;>ef-thum.b" adopted by the Office of Coal Research. 55 Thus 
clearly appears that large amounts of water will be necessary 
coal liquefaction, although perhaps not as much as would 
involved in the coal gasification process. 
Water Law and the Needs of the Coal Conversion Industry. 
Coal gasification and liquefaction factilities will require 
large quantities of water both for cooling purposes and for use 
as a raw material in some of the conversion processes, Therefore, 
t.he feasibility of coal conversion as a means of meeting the 
· nation's future energy needs depends, at least in part, on the 
availability of an adequate and dependable water supply in areas 
such facilities will be located. This involves legal as 
as technological considerations. Not only must the necessary 
be physically available, but coal conversion facilities must 
to obtain a secure enough legal interest in the water to 
the huge capital outlays that such an enterprise requires. 
This study will examine three systems of water allocation, 
order to determine which of them is most responsive to the 
the coal conversion industry. The first is the 
traditional riparian doctrine that prevails in the eastern United 
14 
States. The second is prior appropriation, which is found in 
most of the western states. The third approach, administrative 
allocation, is a hybrid which contains features of both 
riparianism and prior appropriation. Since this study is 
primarily concerned with the feasibility of coal conversion 
operations in Kentucky, particular attention will be given 
to this state's law of water rights, which contains elements 
of both riparianism and administrative allociation. 
I 
I 
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II. The Riparian System 
A. surface Water Consumptive Use Rules. 
consumptive rights to contained surface waters are 
governed by two major allocation systems, riparianism and 
prior appropriation. The riparian system is found in all of 
1 
the eastern states except Mississippi, while the prior 
appropriation system prevails in the West. However, rip-
arian rights also co-exist with appropriative rights in 
2 
those western states which follow the ''California Doctrine," 
but are not usually recognized in those prior appropriation 
3 
states which follow the "Colorado Doctrine." 
The riparian system appears to have origninated in 
4 
America during the early part of the nineteenth century, 
although some commentators have claimed that it developed 
5 6 
from the French Civil Law or the English common law. 
Under the concept of riparianism, both consumptive and 
7 8 
nonconsumptive rights arise from ownership of land 
9 
which 
10 
borders on such natural watercourses as lakes or streams. 
Consequently, as a general rule riparian rights do not 
11 
attach to artificial waterbodies, or to difused surface 
12 
waters. 
Although commentators have differed about the nature of 
, . 13 
riparian rights, they generally agree that no rights of 
ownership attach to the 
14 
remains in the stream 
corpus of the water as long as it 
"because. . so long as it con-
tinues to run there cannot be that possession of it which is 
15 
essential to ownership.'' Instead, in most jurisdictions, 
20 
a riparian owner has only usufructory right to the water. 16 
Moreover, riparian rights are not absolute, but correlative,17 I 
and each landowner must consider the needs of other riparian I 
I 
proprietors. I 
@ 
It 
1. The Natural Flow Doctrine I ~ 
Ii I 
There are two doctrines that govern consumptive rights I 
I 
to water under the riparian system, the natural flow doctrine !! &{ 
¥}, 
~ 
and the reasonable use rule. Under the natural flow doctrine, ' I 
. ~ 
each riparian proprietor on a watercourse is entitled to I 
B 
have the stream flow through his land in its natural con- I 
I dition, not preceptibly retarded, diminshed or polluted by I 
::::::·::dT:::tc::::P:r:::~::rt::tat::r::: :::::: ::l:::itledi 
to have the stream continue flowing in its natural state 
through his land. 19 
$, 
Consumptive uses are not entirely prohibited by the f 
rule, but a distinction is made between "natural" and 
20 
''artificial'' wants or uses. Natural wants are those 
necessary to sustain life and include water for bathing, 
· h . . 21 dri.nking, house old purposes and watering animals. The 
natural flow doctrine allows a riparian proprietor to use as 
much water as he needs for his domestic or natural uses even 
. f . . h . 22 i this drains t e entire stream. 
. 2 3 
Artificial uses increase man's comfort and prosperity 
$; 
and they include irrigation, manufacturing, power generation, I 
-J), 
I 24 mining operations and large-scale stock watering. Riparian 
landowners may divert water for artificial uses as long as 
there is no material interference with the natural flow of 
10 
Ill 
lB 
I I 
.... ,............................................... ..-
21 
the watercourse, but a nondomestic use which noticeably 
affects the natural condition of the stream is actionable by 
a downstream owner even though he is not using the stream 
25 
and suffers no actual damages. The plaintiff is deemed to 
be injured by the change in the natural flow or condition of 
the stream and may obtain nominal damages or injunctive 
26 
relief. In fact, under the natural flow rule, the lower 
owner is virtually forced to institute an action in order to 
protect his rights against the acquisition of a prescriptive 
right by an upper riparian user even though the diversion is 
27 
reasonable and harmless under the existing circumstances. 
In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, when 
many mills and factories were powered by water, the natural 
flow doctrine insured that the water passed down from one 
28 
mill dam to the next. Under modern conditions, however, 
the natural flow doctrine has little utility. It prohibits 
many beneficial, non-harmful uses simply because they materially 
diminish the natural flow of the water. It also permits a 
riparian proprietor to play "dog in the manger"--not using 
the water himself, and depriving the upstream owners of its 
use as well. For these reasons only four or five states 
29 
still adhere to the natural flow doctrine. 
2. The Reasonable Use Rule 
The natural flow doctrine and the reasonable use rule 
reflect widely divergent attitudes about man's relation to a 
30 
watercourse. While the natural flow doctrine emphasizes 
the right to flow of the stream and seeks to maintain, as 
22 
nearly as possible, the status quo of nature, the reasonable 
use rule seeks to promote the fullest beneficial use of 
streams by adjacent riparian owners. 
Under the reasonable use rule, each riparian proprietor • I 
has a privilege to use the water for any beneficial purpose, 
provided that the intended use is reasonable with respect to 
other proprietors on the stream and does not unreasonably 
31 interfere with their legitimate water uses. Of course, 
the mere fact of benefit to the user does not establish the 
32 
reasonableness of the use. Moreover, neither priority of 
use nor the extent of riparian frontage or riparian land are 
. d d . d . . bl 33 generally consi ere in etermining reasona eness. 
Although riparian rights are regarded as equal or correla-
tive, each riparian user is not necessarily entitled to a 
I j! 
l I 
I 
I 
I I. 
%! 41 I 
I ,, 
Ii ~ 
ff:: 
I I 
• fa I 
I 
'iii, 
proportionate share of the available water. 
34 
Indeed, where I 
the water supply cannot satisfy the needs of all riparian 8 
users, some uses, otherwise 
I beneficial, may be deemed unreaso,f 
:Jr 
prohibited. 35 The determination I under the circumstances and 
of the reasonableness of a use is a question of fact to be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis. Various factors may be 
I 
t 
ls' 
f:· 
I 
~; 
considered, including rainfall, climate, season of the year, I 
I 
I customs and usages, size, velocity and capacity of the 
'& I 
watercourse, nature and extent of improvements on the water- I 
it i 
course, amount of water taken, place and method of diversion, I 
II w; 
place of use, previous uses, the object, the extent and type l 
II 
of use, its necessity and importance to society, and the 
uses, rights, and reasonable needs 
. . 36 
of other riparians. 
by its location on the stream. The riparian proprietor at 
I {ii 
I I ,
I 
23 
:its mouth may capture all he can, while the uppermost riparian 
37 
consider the needs of downstream users. 
The reasonable use, like the natural flow doctrine, 
distinguishes between natural and artificial uses, and gives 
38 
preferential use treatment to the former category. Thus, a 
natural or domestic use will always be treated as reasonable, 
39 
while competing artificial uses may be enjoined, but no 
other preferences are recognized under the reasonable use 
<: rule between types or classes of use. 
Finally, the reasonableness of a particular use must be 
determined by present conditions and not by speculation 
40 
concerning future circumstances. Hence, in the absence of 
by other riparians a single riparian owner may use 
41 
all of the water in a stream. However, he does not thereby 
gain any continuing right to the full flow of the stream 
since upstream owners may commence reasonable uses in the 
42 
future. In fact, a use which is reasonable under existing 
circumstances may later become unreasonable when others 
43 
initiate new uses on the watercourse. 
The reasonable use rule, like the natural flow doctrine, 
also governs water quality: A riparian owner may discharge 
"J:;pollutants into a watercourse, but such conduct will be 
unreasonable and can be enjoined if it substantially 
44 
injures another riparian proprietor. 
3. Consumptive Use Restrictions. 
Under both natural flow and reasonable use theories, 
Water rights are based on ownership of riparian land, a 
I 
I 
' 
' 
24 
principle which prevents nonriparian landowners from using 
watercourses and which has led to other use restrictions as 
well. 
(a) Place of Use Restrictions. 
(i) Definitions of Riparian Land 
Since surface water may be used only on "riparian" 
45 
land, the courts have developed several tests to determine 
whether a particular tract is riparian or not. Perhaps the 
most restrictive is the "source of title" test, under which 
riparian rights are limited to the smallest parcel held 
under one title in a chain of title leading to the present 
46 
owner. The size 
by the purchase of 
of a riparian tract cannot be increased 
47 
contiguous nonriparian land, and if 
the back portion of a riparian tract is sold it loses its 
48 
riparian character. Moreover, the subsequent reuniting of 
a severed tract with the abutting tract will not re-establish 
49 
its riparian status. Thus, a riparian tract can be 
decreased, but never increased in those jurisdictions which 
50 
follow the source of title rule. 
The source of title test, which tends to restrict 11 
available surface water supplies to a small group of riparian I 
._I 
owners, originated in California and has been largely confin~I 
~ 
s1 I 
to the western states. The rule supports their policy of ~ 
1:: 
I limiting riparian rights as much as possible in order to I 
52 I 
provide more water for appropriators, but this restrictive! 
I I approach seems inappropriate for eastern states where more I I available. 
J 
-----------------------------1111111 
25 
The "government survey" test, now confined to Texas, 
53 
d th f . 1 1 54 is closely relate to e source o tit e rue. According 
to this theory, riparian land stops at the outermost edge of 
the land away from the stream as described by a single 
original entry of the land in the acquisition of title from 
55 
the government. 
The more inclusive "unity of title" rule provides that 
any tracts contiguous to the abutting tract are riparian, if 
held in common ownership, regardless of when they were 
56 
acquired. This approach permits an increase in the size 
of a riparian parcel by the purchase of contiguous land even 
though the added land had been nonriparian ever since its 
transfer from governmental to private ownership. Given 
the trend toward larger farms and landholdings, application 
of the unity of title theory will result in a continually 
expanding quantity of riparian land. This rule has support 
57 
in both eastern and western jurisdictions. 
The unity of title rule appears superior in an eastern 
jurisdiction than the source of title test. Often a riparian 
owner can use water on land added to his riparian tract land 
without unreasonably curtailing the amount of water available 
for other riparian owners. However, the failure of the 
unity of title rule to impose any restriction on the amount 
of added land which can become riparian when acquired by one 
riparian owner may adversely affect other riparian proprietors. 
Accordingly, some courts have declared that the amount of 
. 58 
riparian land claimed must be reasonable. Under this 
reasonable limit rule, the distance of the land from the 
watercourse is taken into account in deciding the reasonableness 
i !,, 
Ii 
I' 
I . 
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59 
of the particular water use. Arguably, this affords other 
riparians some protection against monopolization of the 
water by one riparian owner. 
(ii) The Watershed Limitation 
The concept of riparian land is further restricted in 
some states by the watershed limitation, which provides that 
any part of a tract of land which lies outside watershed of 
a body of water is not riparian to it even though the tract 
60 
itself borders on a natural watercourse. This watershed 
61 
limitation is followed in a number of western states and 
62 
a few eastern states. 
The watershed limitation is based on the assumption 
that land beyond the watershed is outside the boundaries 
63 
established by nature for riparian ownership and that 
water used on land within the watershed will eventually 
64 
return to the parent body of water. If water is abstracted 
from one watershed and drained into another, downstream 
owners along the first watercourse would be damaged by 
diminution of the stream's flow, while those along the 
second watercourse might be injured by the effects of an 
65 
excessive stream flow. The rule allows a riparian owner 
to use water on his land to the maximum extent while at the 
same time protecting downstream owners, and protects 
riparians who are not currently exercising their riparian 
rights by insuring that water will be available if needed in 
the future. 
27 
Nevertheless, many commentators favor relaxation or 
66 
abolition of the watershed rule. In the East, this 
restriction often unduly limits water use and encourages 
67 
waste of the resource. At the present time a few eastern 
68 
states have expressly adopted the watershed rule, several 
69 
have rejected it, and the majority have not yet taken a 
(iii) Effect of Nonriparian Uses 
A nonriparian use is one in which water is diverted 
nonriparian land. Land which lies outside of a stream's 
is also deemed nonriparian in those states which 
the watershed rule. Thus, both diversions by a 
,,}l.Onriparian landowners and use of water by a riparian owners 
nonriparian land are considered a nonriparian uses. 
Nonriparian uses, however, are not always prohibited. 
""ccording to one view, such uses are wrongful per ~ and 
:riparian owners may obtain appropriate judicial relief even 
70 
suffered no actual damage. In states 
the reasonable use rule, however, a plaintiff 
prove actual damage before he can enjoin a 
71 
use. A few states permit nonriparian uses 
they cause harm to downstream riparian owners; 
72 
nriparian use is simply one factor that is considered in 
termining whether the use is reasonable in accordance with 
73 
requirements of the reasonable use rule. 
(iv) Transfer of Water Rights 
In most states riparian righs are not transferable 
28 
74 
apart from the riparian land to which they are incident, 
but a few jurisdictions have allowed severance of such 
75 
rights. In such cases the right of the nonriparian 
76 
grantee is derivative, and the riparian owner cannot 
77 
convey a greater right than he has. Moreover, while the 
right of the nonriparian grantee is effective against his 
78 
riparian grantor, it is usually inferior to the rights of 
79 
other riparians. 
(bl Use By Municipalities 
In theory, a municipality cannot divert water for 
purposes of public water supply even where it owns riparian 
80 
property. Actually, courts often refuse to prevent 
municipal water utilities drawing from watercourses and deny 
relief on the basis of failure to show damages estoppel or 
latches, or the existence of prescriptive right on behalf of 
81 
the municipality. 
riparian rights for 
A few states have 
82 
municipalities. 
expressly recognized 
Of course, municipaliti 
normally have the power to acquire water rights by eminent 
domain, and once water rights are acquired, the municipality 
may sell water to nonriparians and is not bound by any of 
83 
the restrictions of the riparian doctrine. 
4. Prescriptive Rights 
Most riparian jurisdictions allow both riparian and 
nonriparian owners to acquire prescriptive rights to particula 
84 
water uses. A prescriptive right constitutes a servitude 
85 
against the ownership adversely affected, and thus 
29 
uncompensated transfer of rights from the 
86 
adversely affected riparians to the adverse user. Pre-
scription, like adverse possession, rests on the theory that 
aggrieved parties should seek judicial relief within a 
87 
reasonable time or be forever barred from a remedy. 
In order to ripen into a prescriptive right, the use 
be adverse, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, 
and be made under a claim of right or title. To establish a 
right by prescription the use must be maintained in a manner 
right of the riparian proprietor against whom 
88 
it is claimed. An act is hostile when it is inconsistent 
89 
owner's rights of ownership. Thus, a licensed 
or permissive use can never give rise to a prescriptive 
90 
,right because such uses are not hostile to the titleholder. 
The use must be visible, open and notorious so that the 
owner either knows, or should know, that his rights 
91 
have been invaded. It must also be 
92 
the entire prescriptive period. 
continuous and uninterrupted 
Since some water 
\,l.ses, like irrigation, may be sporatic rather than continuous, 
is probably satisfied if the claimant uses 
as his necessities require. Of course, the initation 
suit puts an end to the adverse character of the use as 
any other substantial interruption during the prescriptive 
93 
riod. Likewise, the adverse use is interrupted if at 
during the limitation period the adverse claimant 
94 
or acknowledges title in the true owner . Finally, 
. e. of water by one claiming a prescriptive right must be 
to necessarily imply an ouster 
the owner's exclusive right of control. 
95 
. I 
30 
Because of the transient nature of water, prescriptive 
water rights are difficult to acquire. In those states 
which follow the natural flow doctrine, there must be an 
actionable invasion of the right to the stream's natural 
96 
flow, while reasonable use jurisdictions require an 
actionable wrong involving actual damages to the servient 
97 
owner. 
The scope of a prescriptive right, once acquired, is 
measured by the use originally made and actually enjoyed 
98 
during the prescriptive period. Once a prescriptive right 
has been perfected, the water use may be changed at any 
99 
time, as long as the new use does not increase the burden 
100 
imposed on the servient estate. Finally, prescriptive 
rights, once acquired, may be lost by abandonment, although 
mere nonuse is only evidence of an intent to abandon and non 
101 
conclusive. 
B. Ground Water Consumptive Use Rules. 
1. Ground Water Hydrology. 
Ground water is found in the zone of saturation, where 
the open spaces between the sand, gravel and rock are 
102 
saturated with water. Above the zone of saturation, there 
is a zone of aeration that may range in thickness from a few 
103 
inches to hundreds of feet. The voids in the rocks in the 
zone of aeration contain both water and air, and the water 
104 
is held by capillarity. In particular, soils may hold 
significant volumes of water against the downward pull of 
105 
gravity. The zone of saturation will usually yield water 
31 
when pumped. Water within the zone of aeration cannot be 
tapped by wells, but it does provide water to plant life on 
106 
surface and protects topsoil against wind erosion. 
Ground water may occur under either water table or 
artesian conditions. Water table conditions exist when the 
ground water surface is free to rise and fall with the water 
supply. The top of the saturation zone is called the water 
107 
Artesian conditions occur when water is confined 
impervious watertight bed called an aquiclude. The 
water is under pressure and will rise above the 
'>water-bearing bed if a well is sunk through the aquiclude.
108 
An underground formation that will yield water is 
109 
aquifer. Ground water either percolates through 
the aquifer or moves in response to hydrostatic pressure and 
>gravity. llO The amount of recharge depends on the permeability 
or mantle rock and on the available water from 
111 
precipitation or streams or other sources. This movement 
from recharge areas to areas 
often only a few 
of natural drainage is normally 
112 . feet per day or less. This 
is an important factor determining the sustained 
of wells, for yield is limited to the quantity of 
that moves to the well from the places where the water 
ground. Wells remote from a source of replenish-
cannot yield water perennially at rates greater than 
rate at which water moves through the acquifer, even 
though much greater quantities of water may be available at 
113 
source. 
The hydrology of ground water is complex and dynamic. 
amount of water that may be safely extracted from a 
32 
ground water basin is not fixed, but varies as manmade or 
natural conditions affect the supply and from the ground 
water formation. These activities include artificial recharg 
e, 
regulation of stream flow by surface storage, vegetative 
cover charges, extension of sewerage systems, paving of 
stream channels, and sealing of the ground surface by the 
114 
spread of urbanization. 
Interference between wells, overdraft of the water-
bearing bed or aquifer, and contamination are all serious 
115 
ground water problems. Interference occurs when wells are 
not properly spaced. When a well is pumped the water level 
surface in the area around the well is lowered as a result 
of the withdrawal of the water. The water-table surface 
forms a depression in the shape of an inverted cone, and 
interference occurs between wells wheri the cones of depression 
116 
overlap. Overdraft occurs when the rate of withdrawal of 
117 
water from an aquifer exceeds the rate of recharge. If 
this continues 
the aquifer is 
the water table will 
118 
said to be mined. 
pollution and salt-water intrusion. 
2. Underground Streams 
be permantly lowered and 
Contamination includes 
119 
Subsurface waters are claosified as either underground 
streams or percolating waters, and different consumptive use 
120 
rules apply to each category. Underground or subsurface 
streams flow in well-defined channels below the earth's 
121 
surface, generally have ascertainable banks and courses, 
and are subject to the same consumptive use rules that 
33 
122 
overn surface watercourses. Underground streams are 
elatively uncommon and one who alleges the existence of an 
nderground stream usually has the burden of proof on that 
123 
·ssue. Furthermore, existence and location of the underground 
stream must be reasonably ascertainable from the surface 
;< ] 24 
ithout excavation. 
Percolating Ground Water 
Percolating waters "ooze, seep or filter through the 
125 beneath the surface, without a defined channel." 
term is commonly used by courts to represent 
variety of hydrologic conditions and serves mainly to dis-
them from underground streams. Ground water is 
to be percolating unless it can be shown that the 
flowing in an underground stream. This is because 
\visible surface indications and scientific information 
usually inadequate to allow an accurate 
qetermination of the source and movement of underground 
Some states have even abandoned the underground 
classification, and hold all ground waters to be 
126 
' percolating. This convergence of physical facts, legal 
>presumptions and standards of proof no doubt explains why 
ourts have in the vast majority of cases classified ground 
127 
ater as percolating. 
Although consumptive use rules with respect to percolating 
hopelessly fragmented and confused, four 
can be discerned: (1) the absolute ownership 
(2) the American rule, (3) the correlative rights 
and (4) the prior appropriation system. 
34 
(a) The Absolute Ownership Doctrine 
According to the English or absolute ownership rule, a 
landowner may extract an unlimited amount of percolating 
ground water from his land and use it on either 
distant lands, regardless of injury to adjacent 
overlying or 
122 landowners. 
The rule imposes liability only for waste or for malicious 
129 
injury to another. 
The absolute ownership rule originated in Acton V 
130 
Blundell, an English case decided in 1842. The plaintiff 
in that case was a manufacturer whose well was affected by 
nearby mining operations. As the defendant pumped water out 
of the shaft of his coal mine, he drew the percolating water 
from under the plaintiff's well. The plaintiff sought 
damages in an action on the case. Although the defendant's 
conduct might have been actionable if a surface watercourse 
had been involved, the court refused to apply the law of 
surface waters because'' . no man can tell what changes 
these underground sources have undergone in the process of 
time . [T]here can be no ground for implying any 
mutual consent or agreement for ages past . . . which is one 
of the foundations on which the as to running streams is 
131 
supposed to be built." 
Instead the court in Acton held that the defendant was 
entitled to use the water as he saw fit, even if he injured 
the plaintiff. This result was justified on the basis that 
the defendant as owner of the overlying land had an exclusive 
132 
right to any percolating ground water beneath his tract. 
35 
The absolute ownership doctrine recognizes a vested 
in the overlying landowner to percolating ground 
water beneath his property whether or not he actually puts 
133 
It has been said that "the percolating 
water belongs to the owner of the land, as much as the land 
134 
ltself, or the rocks and stones in it." However, since a 
landowner has no rights against an adjoining landowner who 
all the water under his land and dries up his 
is somewhat misleading to say that he owns "absolutely" 
135 
the percolating water under the land. Instead it would 
seem that the landowner does not really own the water until 
136 
'he has reduced it to actual possession. The property 
•right involved is the landowner's exclusive right of access 
to the ground water through his land, rather than ownership 
137 
of the underground water itself. 
Followed by many American jurisdictions in the nine-
138 
teenth centry, the absolute ownership rule is still 
139 
.recognized in a number of states. The absolute ownership 
"doctrine, however, now is often criticized because it fails 
·to take into account the nature of ground water and because 
favors municipalities and other large users who are able 
140 
drill deep wells. 
(b} The American Rule 
141 
The American or reasonable use rule, allows a landowner 
use as much percolating ground water as he needs, regardless 
any adverse effect on other landowners, as long as the 
ter use is 
142 
reasonably related to natural use of his overlying 
and. The use must be beneficial; malicious or wasteful 
36 
143 
use is considered unreasonable per se and may 
even though the plaintiff has suffered no actual 
be enjoined 
144 
damage. 
As a general rule, however, the use of water on overlying 
land for agricultural, domestic, mining or manufacturing 
145 
purposes is deemed to be reasonable. 
The absolute ownership doctrine and the American rule 
are virtually the same with respect to the landowner's right 
to use percolating ground water on overlying land, but 
differ significantly in their approach to the extraction and 
transportation of ground water for use in distant areas. The 
absolute ownership doctrine permits ground water to be 
transported and used on non-overlying land without liability 
even though neighboring landowners are injured. According 
to the American rule, however, the sale or use of water on 
distant lands is unreasonable and actionable if it impairs 
the ground water supply of another landowner, even though 
146 
the defendant's use is beneficial. 
The leading case on the American rule is Forbell v. 
147 
City of New York. The plaintiff in Forbell used ground 
water in connection with farming operations on his land. The 
City of New York, which owned an adjoining two-acre tract 
sank a number of wells in order to obtain water for sale to 
the City of Brooklyn. When the defendant's wells interferred 
with his farming operations, the plaintiff sought injunctive 
relief. Although the court conceded that there would be no 
liability under the absolute ownership doctrine, it neverthel 
enjoined the defendant's extraction of ground water for 
transportation and sale to distant users. 
37 
The American rule has displaced the older absolute 
C, ownership doctrine in many jurisdictions, and is now probably 
. . . 148 l h . the majority position. At ough the American rule differs 
absolute ownership theory where the use of ground 
on nonoverlying land is concerned, the two rules are 
similar conceptually and the American rule may be 
149 
regarded as a modification of the absolute ownership doctrine. 
Both rules agree that ownership of percolating waters is in 
150 b . 
'overlying landowners, ut the American rule places 
reasonable limitations upon the exercise of ownership rights 
on much the same basis as the law of private nuisance. 
absolute ownership doctrine, the American rule 
offer any meaningful protection to this property 
interest, but favors large users at the expense of farmers 
and domestic users who tend to have shallow wells and less 
152 powerful pumps. 
(c) The Correlative Rights Doctrine 
The correlative rights doctrine provides that each 
owner over a common ground water pool has an equal and 
correlative right to make a beneficial use of the water on 
·his overlying land. The correlative rights doctrine is 
C!!lometimes known as the "California rule" because it was 
i;introduced by the California Supreme Court in Katz v. Wal-
.lttnshaw. 153 The plaintiff in the Katz case was using ground 
and irrigation purposes on land overlying 
basin. He brought suit when the defendant began 
water for sale and use outside the basin. The 
use of ground water on nonoverlying land 
38 
would not be allowed if it caused injury to an overlying 
user, but went on to declare that landowners above a conunon 
underground basin have such coequal rights in the underlying 
waters as to require that it be prorated among them when the 
available supply was not sufficient to meet the needs of all 
In addition, the court applied the principles of prior 
appropriation to transfers of water beyond overlying land. 
Thus, as between outside users the first taker had priority 
155 
over subsequent users. The Katz case, therefore, representec 
an effort to unify the state's groundwater law with its law 
of surface water streams, which recognized both riparian and 
156 
prior appropriation rights. 
157 
Only California strictly follows the Katz case. In 
other states the correlative rights doctrine does not attempt 
to determine priority among outside users. Outside of 
California the doctrine merely provides that ground water 
must be equitably apportioned among overlying owners in 
times of shortage, with each owner entitled to no more than 
158 
his fair and just proportion. This is sometimes known as 
the eastern correlative rights doctrine. In some instances, 
particularly in the case of irrigators, the correlative 
rights rule limits the user to his proportionate share, 
according to his surface area as compared with the whole 
159 
area overlying the water supply. 
Some writers view the correlative rights doctrine as an 
attempt to analogize the law of percolating ground water to 
160 
the law of surface streams. The approach of these two 
doctrines, with their emphasis on conunon rights to water, is 
39 
using either a surface water reasonable use or a 
,correlative rights rationale a number 
"appear to have abandoned the American 
of eastern 
161 
rule. 
states 
other commentators regard the correlative rights doctrine 
162 
an extension of modification of the American rule. 
two doctrines seem to rest upon different 
163 
water ownership. Under the correlative 
tights rule, overlying owners have only usufructory rights 
under the absolute ownership and American rules, 
rights in the corpus of the water itself. It 
this perception of water as usufructory right that justifies 
that overlying owners share the available 
165 
'water supply in periods of shortage. The surface water 
rule rests on a similar basis. 
As far as equitable considerations are concerned, the 
rights doctrine is superior to either the 
doctrine or the American rule since small 
are better protected and because the effects of a 
shortage must be borne proportionately by all users. 
the other hand, the correlative rights doctrine is 
many of the same criticisms as the surface water 
use rule. The correlative rights rule is so 
that it is exceedingly difficult to apply to 
166 
conditions. Moreover, it offers no security to 
developers by protecting the supply of the amount of 
ter on which they have relied, nor does it permit landowners 
acquire a more secure right to an adequate supply of 
167 
or contract. 
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(d) The Prior Appropriation System 
Prior appropriation, the prevailing system of surface 
water allocation in the West, is discussed at greater length 
in Chapter III. In most of those states underground streams 
are subject to appropriation in the same manner as surface 
168 
waters. Increasingly, these states have moved toward 
public control and management in the distribution of their 
169 
percolating ground water as well. Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming 
now have separate ground water codes based on the prior 
170 
appropriation model, and five other states, Kansas, North 
Dakota, South Dakota and Alaska, have made their general 
appropriation statutes applicable to percolating ground 
171 
water. The remaining western states follow one of the 
common law rules and do not apply prior appropriation 
principles to ground water. California, of course, follows 
the correlative rights doctrine, Arizona and Nebraska follow 
172 
the American rule, while Texas continues to adhere to the 
173 
absolute ownership doctrine. 
Under the appropriation theory, overlying landowners 
have no proprietary interest in percolating ground water 
beneath their land as they do under the absolute ownership 
and American rules. Instead, ground water is owned by the 
state or by the public and individual rights in it, which 
are usufructory in nature, can only be acquired by beneficial 
174 
use. As with surface waters, during periods of water 
shortage the rights of later appropriators of an underground 
basin must yield to those of earlier appropriators. 
41 
Despite its greater suitability to stream water, the 
~rior appropriation system has been successfully applied to 
~round water in arid states. It encourages early development 
1nd use of water resources, provides users with a relatively 
ecure water right, and encourages continued use by providing 
175 
loss of rights by non-use. But while prior appropriation 
some degree of certainty as to rights and order of 
there are disadvantages to its inherent rigidity. 
as it encourages the early land developers in an area, 
also discourages subsequent development of valuable land 
176 
nee the available water supply has been appropriated. 
Ground Water Pollution 
Contamination of ground water has become a serious 
oblem in some areas of the country. Although federal and 
177 
tate legislation now deal with ground water pollution, 
ivate law remedies are also available. In the case of pol-
ution of an underground stream, the surface water reasonable 
prevails and pollution which unreasonably interferes 
178 
uses of other overlying landowners is not allowed. 
ere percolating ground waters are affected, however, neither 
e absolute ownership rule nor the American rule provide 
179 
h protection to injured landowners. Such cases seldom 
olve a proprietary beneficial use of the water in question, 
t rather a proprietary use of the land whereby the per-
180 
lating waters are incidentally affected. Perhaps for 
the allocation rules are usually ignored and 
181 
ability is imposed on the basis of private nuisance, 
183 182 
ligence, or strict liability principles. 
42 
c. The Law of Water Allocation in Kentucky 
1. Water Resources in Kentucky. 
Kentucky's climate and topography insure that water 
generally will be available. The average annual rainfall 
ranges from 36 to 42 inches in the northern counties, 42 to 
47 inches in the central portion of the state, and 47 to 50 
inches in the southern area. This produces 45-inch average 
184 
annual rainfall. Although there are seasonal variations, 
rainfall is generally adequate throughout the year. 
Kentucky has 544 square miles of streams, rivers, lakes 
186 
and reservoirs. The flowing surface waters of the state 
comprise a network of rivers and streams ranging from the 
Ohio River and its main tributaries to the small creeks 
which drain into the Ohio's lesser tributary streams. The 
Ohio' forms the northern boundary of Kentucky for a distance 
of 664 miles and drains a total area of 204,000 square miles 
187 
from portions of fourteen states. (See Figure 1.) About 
97 percent of Kentucky's 40,000 square mile area drains into 
the Ohio River, mainly through seven major river basins: 
Big Sandy, Licking, Kentucky, Salt, Green, Cumberland and 
Tennessee rivers. (See Figure 2.) The remaining area, 
located in extreme western Kentucky, drains directly into 
188 
the Mississippi River. There are no natural lakes of any 
size in the state, but a number of large artificial lakes or 
reservoirs, such as Lake Cumberland, Kentucky Lake and Lake 
Barkley, have been created by river impoundment. In addi tioDi,' 
throughout the state impoundments on small tributary or 
headwater streams have created a number of small lakes and 
ponds for farm use, municipal water supply or recreational 
43 
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Finally, there are many large springs, some 
190 flowing several hundred gallons per minute in Kentucky. 
Ground water is also plentiful in many parts of the 
There are five major ground water provinces in 
Kentucky, the Eastern Coal Field Region, the Blue Grass 
Region, the Mississippian Plateau Region, the Western Coal 
191 
Region and the Jackson Purchase Region. (See Figure 
The Jackson Purchase Region and the alluvial fill areas 
along the Ohio River are the richest sources of ground water 
in Kentucky, but good to moderate supplies are also available 
from the Mississippian Plateau and Western Kentucky Coal 
192 
Field regions. 
Surface Water Allocation Rules. 
Although Kentucky is a riparian state, it was unclear 
_until recently whether it followed the natural flow doctrine 
:"or the reasonable use rule since the Court of Appeals sometimes 
' 
i.used the two doctrines interchangably. Anderson v. Cin-
. 193 
,:cinnati Southern Railway, an early case, is illustrative. 
J,The plaintiff in Anderson owned a grist mill on a small 
" 
,creek. Two miles above the mill the defendant railroad 
constructed a small dam to supply a reservoir of 
•-water for its trains. The dam, however, interferred with 
plaintiff's mill and he brought suit. 
The court declared that "[t]he right of every riparian 
the enjoyment of a stream of running water in its 
in flow, quantity, and quality is now well 
194 
language which implied that the court was 
the natural flow theory. Later portions of the 
however, were suggestive of the reasonable use 
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The owner is entitled to the reasonable 
use of the water for natural and domestic 
purposes; but when he undertakes to divert 
the course of the stream, or detain the 
water by means of a dam, so as to prevent the 
previous supply to other riparian owners, he 
became a wrongdoer. The use and de-
tention of the water on a large stream by means 
of a dam, for purposes of the railroad, might 
not be an unreasonable use, as ordinarily there 
would be ample water left for all the purposes 
of the riparian owners below; yet, where the 
stream is small, or even large, if the dam 
so obstructs the water as to diminish the flow 
and lessen the capacity of the water power 
below, it is an injury to the proprietor for 
which damages may be awarded. 
In the end the court reversed the trial court's decision 
the plaintiff and ordered a new trial. The court stated 
plaintiff should not recover unless he suffered 
injury from the defendant's use of the water. 
196 
In Fackler v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.R.C. Co., the 
·defendant railroad placed a dam across a small creek, 
impounding the water and preventing it from flowing into 
the plaintiff's land. The court declared that a "proprietor 
entitled to have the water of a stream flow to his land 
its natural course undiminished in quantity and unimpaired 
197 
quality." However, relief was denied because the 
not show any damage. 
198 
In City of Louisville v. Tway, the defendant also 
reducing the velocity of its flow. 
created a pollution problem for the plaintiff. The 
199 
stated that: 
It is true, as suggested by counsel for 
appellant, that our court is committed to the 
"natural flow rule" though as we read the two 
rules (reasonable use) ... the distinction 
is rather close, and even under what may be 
48 
termed the more restricted theory (natural) 
flow), ..• each riparian owner is recognized 
as having a privilege to use the water to 
supply his natural wants, and extraordinary or 
artifical uses, so that such does not sensibly 
or materially affect the quantity of the water 
and such uses by the lower riparian owner. 
The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show 
that the defendants had made "unreasonable use of the water 
from the stream." It also declared, however, that the 
defendants' dam "did not appreciably affect the flow of 
water" in the stream. Thereupon, the court upheld the lower 
court's refusal to grant injunctive relief since the defen-
dant's actions had not caused any demonstrated harm to the 
plaintiff's property. 
The continuing uncertainty between the natural flow 
and reasonable use theories led in 1954 to a legislative 
200 
adoption of the reasonable use rule: 
The owner of land continguous to public 
water shall have the right to such reasonable 
use of this water for other than domestic pur-
poses or impair existing uses of other owners 
heretofor established, or unreasonably interfere 
with a beneficial use by other owners. 
Although this provision was repealed in 1966, the 
reasonable use rule appears to be securely established in 
201 
this state. Daugherty v. City of Lexington is the most 
recent case on point. In this case the City of Lexington 
denied a building permit to the plaintiff, who had plans to 
build a restaurant, because he failed to show that his 
septic tank system would not endanger the purity of city 
water in a nearby reservoir. The plaintiff argued that 
his proposed restaurant would be a reasonable use of his 
land. The court quoted from a Michigan case, People v. 
Hulbert, 202 which set forth a reasonable use formula for 
49 
. . in determining whether a use is reasonable 
we must consider what the use is for, its 
extent, duration, necessity, and its application; 
the nature and size of the stream, and the several 
uses to which it is put; the extent of the injury 
to the one proprietor and of the benefit to the 
other; and all other facts which may bear upon 
the reasonableness of the use. 
to the court, the determination of reasonable 
use is a question of fact to which a balancing test must 
The necessity of the use of water must be 
considered and balanced against the harm which would ensue 
the use. 
Many of Kentucky cases have involved impairment of 
·water quality rather than consumptive uses. In Kraver 
204 
a distillery caused a pollution problem by 
its waste into a nearby stream. The court 
~-
t 1 .. -...... h th tht o a ower ripar:J..iart on t e eory a 
entitled to the natural flow of water, 
unimpaired in quality, except as may be occasioned by 
205 
reasonable use of the stream by other proprietors'.' 
Kentucky, like almost all eastern jurisdictions, limits 
use of surface water to riparian land. In Bank of 
206 
"~Opkinsville v. Western Kentucky Asylum for the Insane, 
defendant purchased a small tract of land on a stream. 
nstructed a pumping station, and transported the water 
ruse on nonriparian land located about three-quarters 
This diversion interferred with the oper-
tion of the plaintiff's grist mill and he brought suit 
the defendant from continuing its nonriparian use. 
court agreed that the Hospital could not transport 
water to a nonriparian tract if this caused injury to a 
50 
Kentucky apparently recognizes prescriptive rights. In 
207 
W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, a coal company obtained the 
right to pollute a stream because the lower riparian owner 
allowed the defendant's use to continue throughout the 
statutory prescriptive period. 
3. Ground Water Allocation Rules. 
Like most states Kentucky recognizes the legal distinctio,. 
between underground streams and percolating ground water. 
208 
In Nourse~ Andrews, a plaintiff owning land on the 
Muddy River in Logan County tried to stop the City of 
Russellville from using two springs for its water supply 
since this caused the river to be depleted. The plaintiff 
argued that the springs were part of the source of the river 
but lost when he was unable to prove this allegation. The 
court stated that one who alleges the existence of an under-
209 
ground stream has the burden of proof and added that: 
Subterranean streams, as distinguished 
from subterranean percolations, are 
governed by the same rules, and give 
rise to the same rights and obligations 
as flowing surface streams. . The 
owner of the land under which a stream 
flows can, therefore, maintain an action 
for the diversion of it, if such diversion 
took place under the same circumstances as 
would have enabled him to recover, if the 
stream had been wholly above ground. 
Therefore, according to the Nourse case, a landowner 
may assert riparian rights to underground water only if he 
can prove the existence of an underground stream. In 
2] 0 
Commonwealth v. Sebastian, such proof was established by 
pointing to a line of green grass which flourished in spite 
of dry weather. The court in Sebastian also stated that 
51 
·"there is an initial presumption that subterranean waters 
are percolating, but once a subterranean stream is shown to 
"eidst, there arises a presumption that it has a fixed and 
211 
definite course and channel." 
In the case of percolating ground water, Kentucky 
riginally followed the absolute ownership rule. In Kinnard 
212 
. Standard Oil Co. the court stated that percolating 
'waters "belong to the soil, constitute part of it, and may 
~e used, controlled, or removed by the owner in the same 
manner that he could the soil through which the water 
213 
'percolates or runs." In Long v. Louisville & Nashville 
214 
ailway Co. the court declared that "The rule is universal 
may dig on his own land such wells as he 
'~eeds, al though in doing so he may dig up his neighbor's 
. 215 216 
The doctrine was reaffirmed in Nourse v. Andrews: 
Percolating waters are part of the earth 
itself, as much as the soil and stones, 
with the same absolute right of use and 
appropriation by the owner of the land 
.. The law seems to be well settled 
that water percolating through the soil 
is not, and cannot be, distinguished from 
the soil itself. The owner of the soil is 
entitled to the waters percolating through 
it, and such water is not subject to the 
appropriation. 
The absolute ownership rule, however, was replaced by 
of reasonable use in Sycamore Coal 
In this action, the plaintiff brought suit 
en the defendant coal company's core hole, used to test 
caused the water in his well to disappear. The 
plugged the hole, but the water rose only 14 
Ches, as compared to the previous 54-inch level. The 
52 
court found no evidence to establish the existence of an 
underground stream, and, therefore, assumed the waters to be 
percolating. 
The court limited the landowner over subterranean 
percolating waters to a "reasonable and beneficial use of 
the waters . . and he had no right to waste them, whether 
through malice or indifference, if, by such waste, he injures 
218 . 
a neighboring landowner." Since the landowner's use was 
"properly connected with the use, enjoyment and development 
of the land its elf," the court held that he was entitled to 
all he could use, regardless of the depletion of his neigh-
bor's supply. 
cases of ground water pollution have also arisen in 
219 
Kentucky. For instance, Kinnard v. Standard Oil Co. 
allowed a spring owner to recover damages from the defendant 
because defendant's coal oil storage tanks leaked and pollu 
plaintiff's spring, which was fed by percolating waters. In 
220 
accord is Rogers v. Bond Brothers, 
221 
quoted from Cooley on Torts: 
where the court 
It is said in an early case that where 
one has filthy deposits on his premises, 
he whose dirt it is must keep it that 
it may not trespass. Therefore, if 
filthy matter from a privy or other 
place of deposit percolates through the 
soil of the adjacent premises, or breaks 
through into the neighbor's cellar, or 
finds its way into his well, this is a 
nuisance. 
222 
However, in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, a gas 
company defendant was not held liable when a newly-drilled 
53 
"as well contaminated the plaintiff's home water source. The 
that "the owner of land when putting it to a 
egitimate and not unreasonable use is not liable to the 
land for injuries to well or springs fed 
223 
hidden underground waters." 
The Riparian System and Coal Conversion 
Surface Water Consumptive Use Rules 
The riparian system is not particularly responsive to 
needs of the coal conversion industry. This is es-
the reasonable use rule, which prevails 
most eastern jurisdictions, including Kentucky. Ideally, 
rights should be both definite and secure: the water 
should be clearly defined with respect to quantity 
in terms of its relation to the rights of other users. 
bl l h . . 224 reasona e use rue, owever, is vague and uncertain. 
the nature of the reasonable use concept, 
cannot know wii'ih any precision who may use the 
ilable water, how much he can use, or for what purpose 
This is because any use must be reason-
with respect to the uses of other riparian owners, and 
e uses are constantly changing. 226 As long as these 
rtainties exist, private investment in water-based enter-
8 such as coal conversion facilities will be discouraged. 
The uncertain nature of the user's water right under 
riparian system is further aggravated because mechanisms 
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for resolving controversies among water users are severely 
limited. Not only is litigation time-consuming, expensive 
and uncertain in its outcome, but the results even of 
successful litigation are narrow and limited in scope. 
First of all, the judgment relates only to the parties be-
fore the court and not other water users. Since the courts 
will usually not apportion a stream between competing users 
the judgment will be an "all or nothing" finding for one 
party or another. Moreover, the judgment pertains only 
to the facts as they exist at a given time and new develop-
' 
ments which change the relative positions of the parties 
cannot adequately be dealt with without further litigation. 221 
Another criticism is that the riparian system tends 
f 1 . 1 . ff" . . 228 to oster ocationa ine iciencies. In most states it 
excessively restricts the use of the water for the benefit 
f . . l d 229 o non-riparian an. Since many beneficial uses consume 
water some distance from the point of diversion, these 
locational restrictions probably result in less efficient 
230 
water use. This could present serious problems if 
some aspects of the coal conversion took place on non-
riparian land. 
Thus while the riparian system possesses the advantage 
of flexibility, insecurity of water right and locational 
restrictions do not promote efficient water use. 
2. Ground Water Consumptive Use Rules 
· · · zed Both hydrologists and legal commentators have critic1 • 
the existing law of water rights for its failure to recognize 
231 · 
the relationship between surface and ground water. Th1 8 
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terrelation between percolating ground water and 
rface water supports a uniform allocation rule for all 
232 
of water. Only the correlative rights doctrine 
·fficiently resembles the surface water reasonable use 
le, both in terms of allocative standard and in terms 
underlying theory of property interest in the water, 
courts to fashion a rational and integrated 
11 t . 233 of water a oca ion. 
Unfortunately, the correlative rights doctrine is 
deficiencies as its surface water 
unterpart, the riparian reasonable use rule. There are 
uncertainties, however, under e·i ther the American 
or the absolute ownership doctrine. From the per-
the coal conversion industry, the American 
e would be superior to the correlative rights doctrine 
ause industrial users, who could construct the deepest 
ls, would be able to secure as much water as they needed 
use on overlying land without having to concern them-
the requirements of smaller-scale users such as 
The English or absolute ownership rule is even 
suitable to the water needs of the coal conversion 
Coal conversion facilities, like other indust-
only may obtain a secure water right (as they 
rule), but the water obtained can be 
owner's overlying land. Thus, under 
·absolute ownership doctrine, there are no locational 
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restrictions, and additional ground water can always be 
transported from distant well fields if water supplies in 
the immediate area become inadequate. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the absolute 
ownership doctrine and the American rule, while well suited 
to the needs of the coal conversion industry, are probably 
not responsive to those of other water users in the state. 
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III. The Prior Appropriation System. 
Prior appropriation, the great rival of the riparian 
system, is the primary method of water allocation west of 
the Mississippi River. There is some disagreement about the 
origin of prior appropriation. Some believe that it came 
from the Indian, Spanish and Mexican occupation of the 
Southwest. Another view is that it was born of necessity in 
1 
the California gold mining camps. 
Priority and beneficial use are fundamental elements of 
the prior appropriation system. The doctrine provides that 
the appropriator who is first in time is first in right, and 
a prior or earlier appropriator is entitled to satisfy his 
dbf b . k 2 water nee s e ore a su sequent appropriator may ta e any. 
Priorty of appropriation ordinarily governs the respective 
rights of the various users regardless of whether the senior 
appropriator diverts water at a point above or below the 
points at which junior appropriators make their diversions 
3 from the stream. The junior appropriator also possesses a 
legally-protected water right, although it is subordinate to 
that of the senior appropriator. Hence, "if the person who 
first appropriates the waters of a stream only appropriates 
a part, another person may appropriate a part on the whole 
of the residue; and when appropriated by him, his right 
thereto is as perfect, and entitled to the same protection, 
as that of the first appropriator to the portion appro-
priated by him." 4 
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Under prior appropriation, water rights are derived 
beneficial use of the water rather than from land ownership. 5 
only must the purpose of the use be a beneficial one, 
the methods of diverting the water, conveying it to the 
of use and applying it to the land or machinery for 
it is appropriated,must also be as efficient as 
under the circumst,rnces. 6 
Appropriations are fixed in terms of a definite quan-
of water, 7 usually expressed in cubic feet per second 
for direct diversion or in acre-feet for reservoir storage.8 
Often diversions are limited to specific times of the day or 
Moreover, administrative procedures for appropriating 
water invariably require the applicant to designate the 
proposed place of use for the water he desires to appropriate.10 
place of use may be on nonriparian land.11 
In the West water rights are perpetual in duration, 
although they may be lost or abandoned through nonuse.12 
For allocating water during times of shortage, or for chasing 
simultaneous applications, several states have 
13 
statutes giving certain uses preferred status. 
also give these preferred uses condemnation 
Nowadays, appropriative rights usually operate within a 
comprehensive statutory and administrative framework. In 
permits are issued by a state administrative 
pursuant to some form of adjudicative process and the 
often has the power to deny or modify permit applications 
protect senior appropriators or the public 
,, 
' 
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The proponents of prior appropriation maintain that 
this approach provides for a more secure water right than 
the riparian system and thus encourages more efficient use 
of available water resources than its eastern rival. Accor-
ding to one commentator, the prior appropriation doctrine 
"avoids much of the uncertainty inherent in the riparian 
rights rule" by giving "each appropriator relative certainty 
as to the amount of water which will be available for his 
use." 16 Another commentator has characterized the prior 
appropriation system as one of "secure water rights that 
tend to encourage investment and thus lead to maximum use. ,,l? 
Certainly the more senior appropriators are assured a 
relatively dependable supply of water and thereby some 
' f 't l ' 18 dd' ' l f security or capi a investment. Two a itiona eatures of 
prior appropriation promote efficient water use. One is the 
absence of place-of-use limitations. Since water may be 
used anywhere, approriators will be more likely to use it 
wherever it can best be used. The other feature is the 
beneficial use requirement. Appropriators may obtain rights 
only to water which they actually utilize and water rights 
which do not continue to be exercised beneficially will be 
lost under abandonment or forfeiture concepts." 
The prior appropriation system is not without faults of 
its own. Although water rights under prior appropriation 
are generally regarded as more certain than those under 
riparianism, in many cases this is true only of senior 
appropriators. The rights of a junior appropriator are 1e55 
secure. Since they can take only the water that remains 
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after the needs of senior appropriators have been satisfied, 
junior appropriators may be unable to obtain their full 
· ' h f h ' 19 1 ' ' 
.· appropriation muc o t e time. A so, there is some evidence 
that the prior appropriation system is inflexible and tends 
'to freeze uses of water into a rigid pattern based upon the 
appropriation pattern.20 This is perhaps due to 
that changes in use or location,although theoreti-
'cally possible, are often difficult to make in practice. 21 
In some states, for instance, changes in location of the 
1 f 
. , , 22 pace o use may require a new appropriation. 
rigidity because no appropriator will give up 
is senority in order to change his place of diversion or 
Several states have attempted to alleviate this 
by allowing such changes without loss of priority as 
existing rights are not adversely affected.23 
Unfortunately, the effect of such a change on other appro-
is often difficult (and expensive) to predict. 24 
same rule usually applies to changes of use as well. 
difficulty in securing approval is especially acute when 
applicant contemplates a change from a nonconsumptive to 
consumptive use, thereby diminishing the rate of return 
low to the stream and impairing the rights of downstream 
appropriators.25 
Despite the beneficial use requirement, water is 
metimes wasted in prior appropriation jurisdictions. 
tended to be developed first because they 
re easier to develop. Unfortunately, water sent down 
I.! 
I 
80 
a stream to those sites to satisfy senior rights may be 
subject to serious transmission losses as a result of high 
26 
evaporation rates and porous stream beds. Over-appropriatL~ 
or the practice of "padding" and "pyramiding" water rights 
by obtaining permits in excess of reasonable needs is also a 
27 
serious case of waste. In some instances, the excess 
water claimed but not used has been allowed to run to waste 
in order to avoid forfeiture of the water right through 
28 
nonuse. 
Finally, prior appropriation does not always protect 
water supply for public uses. Western courts have often 
refused to recognize public uses of water flows for re-
creational purposes as beneficial uses subject to appro-
priation and have subordinated these uses to the rights of 
. . 29 private appropriators, although some states have overcome 
this interpretation by expressly allowing appropriations for 
. . 30 
various public uses. 
Some commentators have urged that riparianism be 
replaced by the western system of prior appropriation. 31 
Although nine eastern jurisdictions have considered the idea 
in the past thirty years, 32 only Mississippi has actually 
abandoned its common law system in favor of prior appro-
priation. 33 Such a move could create severe administrative 
problems. If presently exercised riparian rights were 
preserved, it would be very difficult to integrate the two 
systems into a single coherent allocative framework. The 
experiences of the "California rule" states in the West 
34 demonstrate the hazards of this approach. On the other 
81 
riparian rights were abolished, assuming that it 
'was constitutional to do so, and temporal priorities were 
established on the basis of historical use, the task of 
uocumenting such claims would be virtually impossible. The 
only alternative would be to allow all users to make new 
claims and recognize temporal priorities on the basis of 
1 . . 35 of app ication. 
At first blush prior appropriation seems better suited 
the needs of the coal conversion industry than the riparian 
Water rights are more precisely defined and (at least 
for senior appropriators) more secure under the prior appro-
system than under common-law riparianism. The ab-
place of use restrictions under prior appropriation 
another advantage over the riparian doctrine. 
On the other hand, as the discussion above has shown, 
are a number of weaknesses in the prior appropriation 
Therefore, it will be necessary to examine a third 
roach, water allocation by means of a statutorily created 
it is superior to both riparianism 
prior appropriation. 
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rv. state Regulation of Consumptive Water Uses 
Because water is usually plentiful in the East, 
the riparian system, despite its many deficiencies, has 
provided a satisfactory framework for water allocation. 
since World War II, however, a number of states, in-
eluding Kentucky, have modified the common law doctrines 
by legislative enactment. Although some states con-
sidered adoption of the western systems of prior appro-
priation, most preferred hybrid systems possessing char-
acteristics of both riparianism and prior appropriation. 
Consumptive Water Use Regulation in Eastern Coal-
Producing States 
There are twelve coal-producing states in the eastern 
United States. The common law riparian system is the 
primary water allocation mechanism in Alabama, Illinois, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia. 
permit systems exist in the remaining coal-
states of Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
and North Carolina. 
Indiana 
The 1951 Ground Water Conservancy Act gives the 
Department of Conservation power to restrict withdrawal 
groundwater if natural replenishment is insufficient. 1 
a restricted area, users of groundwater, except cities, 
not increase their use by more than 100,000 gallons 
day without first obtaining a permit. 2 Indiana formerly 
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also had a surface water conservancy act, but this was 
repealed in 1963. 
2. Iowa 
In 1957 the Iowa Legislature passed a water rights 
law establishing a permit system under the control of the 
Natural Resources Council, administered by a Water Com-
missioner, and regulating rights to both surface and 
ground water. Though the law purports to leave unimpaired 
all "vested rights," it regulates both existing and unused 
. h 3 rig ts to water. 
The Iowa law requires that all substantial uses of 
water be "beneficiaL" That term is defined to mean the 
application of water to a useful purpose enuring to the 
benefit of the water user and subject to his dominion and 
control. 4 Permits are issued by the Water Commission. 
These permits have a general limitation of ten years, and 
the law prohibits the diversion, storage, or withdrawal of 
water for most substantial uses from any natural watercouril!i 
underground basin or watercourse, drainage ditch, or 
settling basin (except for ordinary household purposes and 
use for domestic animals) without a permit. 5 The Water 
Commissioner may suspend the operation of permits if 
necessary during an emergency, establish priorities for 
water distribution, and thus protect the public interest 
6 from danger. 
The statute directs that the standard for determinin; 
the disposition of applications is one of beneficial use 
to be applied in a broad manner. 7 The commissioner has 
87 
sought to discriminate on the basis of differences among 
beneficial uses; if the applicant can show that his use 
is beneficial, he will receive a permit. The effect of this 
policy, along with the abundant rainfall in the state, has 
the first ten years of operation only two 
applications for permits were denied. Both involved the 
disposition of drainage waters. Not a single application 
store, or withdraw water was denied during this 
Maryland 
Maryland's permit is administered by the Department 
Water Resources, which operates within the Department 
9 Natural Res9urces. Domestic, farming and municipal 
,uses are exempted from regulation, as well as water uses 
10 
'in existence on January l, 1934. The Department may 
· Cgrant a permit if the proposed use provides for the greatest 
utilization of the waters of the state and will 
general welfare. 11 Conversely, the Department 
reject any proposed use that is ''inadequate, wasteful, 
impracticable" or detrimental to the public 
terest. 12 
The permit specifies the amount of water to be used, 
W 11 th d · f h d d' · 13 e as e nature an location o t e propose 1vers1on. 
is no time limit on these permits, but water rights 
b 14 e reduced or lost through nonuse. There is no 
tion of transferability of permit rights in the Mary-
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4. North Carolina 
North Carolina enacted a comprehensive permit system 
in 1967. The act declares that it is the policy of the 
state to put waters "to beneficial use to the fullest ex-
tent to which they are capable, subject to reasonable 
regulation." 15 The Board of Water and Air Resources is 
authorized to establish "capacity use areas" in any area 
where there is such demand for surface or ground water that 
regulation is necessary to protect both public and private 
. t t 16 1.n eres s. The Board may adopt regulations to conserve 
both surface and ground water supplies in such areas and 
permits may be required for water uses in excess of 100,000 
17 gallons per day. 
In determining whether to grant or deny an application, 
the Board is merely required to act in the public interest. 
However, section 143-215.14(h) sets forth nine guidelines 
to be considered by the Board in adopting rules and regu-
lations, considering permit applications, and acting on 
revocations and modifications of permits. The act provides 
that if the applicant is able to prove that he was using 
water prior to the date of the declaration of a capacity 
use area and the Board finds that the use was "reasonably 
necessary," it must grant a permit as long as the use will 
not adversely affect existing or potential public and priV" 
. th 18 uses 1.n e area. Moreover, in granting a permit, the 
Board is directed to consider the prior investments of 
person in the land or plans made for utilizing water in 
connection with such land. 19 
Permits may be granted for (1) ten years, (2) the 
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duration of the existence of the capacity use area, or 
(3) the period found by the Board to be necessary for 
reasonable amortization of the applicant's water with-
. f 'l' . 20 1 h h ' drawal or water-using aci ities. At oug permits 
may be renewed, they are subject to modification or re-
vocation upon not less than 60 days' notice to the permit 
holder. Water rights under the permit system are not 
21 
transferable without the Board's approval. 
Consumptive Water Use Regulation in Other Eastern States 
A number of other riparian jurisdictions have created 
consumptive use permit systems. These include Delaware, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wis-
Of these, the Florida act is by far the most com-
Delaware 
Delaware's water use regulation, enacted in 1966 
administered by the Department of Natural Resources 
Environmental Control. 22 Both surface and ground 
'''water are covered. Existing uses are exempted from con-
use regulation, but the act provided that ''no 
in the amount of water used shall be made be a 
23 
user without prior approval of the Department." 
re are also exemptions for domestic and agricultural uses 
24 
well as some municipal uses. 
The time limit on the permits is uncertain and the 
terminate any permit when the water use exercised 
is no longer deemed to be ''reasonably beneficial.'025 
! i 
i ! 
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Water rights 
suspended if a water 
by the governor. In that event, water is allocated 
accord:ilng to a ty le provided that 
water first be used to sustain life, thGn to maintain 
health, and then to 
may be transferred with the 
2. Florida 
\,1ealt.l:1~ 26 Permit rights 
~7 
the age11cy ~ £, 
The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 established 
an elaborate structure for the istration of water 
rights. 28 Primarily re sible for the· implementation 
of the act, the Division of Interior Resources asserts 
broad authority over surveyr research, and investigation 
into all aspects of water use and 
also requires the Division to f 
29 q:1.1ality,, The statute 
a. corrrpreb.e11sive 
t t 1 
30 
sate wa er pan. There are eight criteria by which 
the plan is to be developed, each keyed to a different 
use to cover all poss The Act provides 
that the state ,,i?ate:r:· tlse. t)la:n car1n.ot. be a,dopt.ed or modif 
without first a public 
The Act cre;sit.es fi 1IE; 1,,n::1.t.er districts CI.is;vic1ed accord-
ing to The governing boards 
of the di resident members 
are authori 
enginee1~s I anO. 
is to ac·t on, t applic 
34 In order to issue, 
modify, or a 
but in an emergency the board may issue orders that are 
be immediate com pl with. The affected 
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require a hearing by the board. 
The common-law rules of riparian rights are almost 
entirely negated by the 1972 act, and except for domestic 
use, all other uses must be by permit. 36 Existing riparian 
users are not entitled to permits as a matter of right 
but they are given a preferential right to them. 37 
Permit applications must demonstrate that the 
proposed use is a reasonable-beneficial one, will not 
interfere with any presently existing legal use, and 
is consistent with the public interest. 38 "Reasonable-
beneficial use" is defined to mean ''the use of water in 
such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient 
utilization for a purpose and in a manner which is both 
reasonable and consistent with the public interest.• 39 
The act created the following permit classifications: 
(1) consumptive use (2) wells (3) storage and impoundments 
(4) wast discharges (5) discharges into aquifiers, The 
application must contain the identity of the applicant, 
source of the water supply, quantity applied for, nature 
Of d d . t f d' ' 40 propose use, an poin o iversion. If the use 
is to be less than 150,000 gallons per month, no hearing 
is required if no objections are filed. 41 
To accommodate competing applications, the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources can modify the applications 
to minimize conflict. 42 If two applications are other-
wise equal, perference is to be given to renewal app-
lications over initial applications. 43 
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A permit may be issued for any period of time up to 
twenty years, but a permit may be issued for fifty years 
if the permittee is a municipailty, public works, or 
bl . . . 44 pu ic service corporation. Also, a permit may be 
modified or renewed prior to the expiration date. In 
addition, the act provides for permit revocation in five 
situations: 45 (1) when the permittee makes a materially 
false statement on the application, (2) wilful violation 
of permit conditions, (3) violation of any provision of 
the act, (4) non~use for two consecutive years, (5) per-
mittee consent. 
The Department is to formulate a plan of classificatir;1; 
to determine which users are to be given priority of use 
46 during periods of water shortage. "Shortage" within the 
meaning of the act exists when there is insufficient water 
to satisfy permit requirements, or when reduction in water 
use is necessary to protect water sources from serious ha. 
3. Minnesota 
In Minnesota, the Comrtlission of Natural Resources 
supervises the use and allocation of surface and under-
48 ground water. Under the Minnesota statute any person, 
including state agencies, must acquire a permit to use 
water, unless the use is specifically exempted. 49 
Riparian rights existing at the time of the statutorf 
enactment are specifically exempted from permit requirem 
Further exempted is any domestic use serving less then 
twenty-five persons, any beneficial use in existence on 
July 1, 1973 outside a municipality, and any beneficial 
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in existence prior to July 1, 1959 within a municipal 
51 
boundary. 
To acquire a permit a prospective user must submit 
application to the Commission; a copy must also be 
'sent to the director of the watershed district. 52 Acting 
twenty days, the commissioner must grant a permit 
use is practical and in the public interest. 53 A 
can be rejected if the proposed use would be 
wasteful or dangerous. 54 A hearing is not mandatory un-
an interested party files notice demanding one. 55 
Any party in interested may appeal the commissioner's 
to the county court within thirty days. 56 The 
appeal is tried on the record; the commissioner's findings 
of fact are prima facie evidence of the matter therein, and 
orders are deemed prima facie reasonable. 57 
Since state waters may not be utilized without a 
;;permit, the legislature has estal;>lished a category of 
use priorities. Rules governing the allocation 
potential users are to be enacted in 197s. 58 
The stated priorities upon which the rules are to be 
as follows: first priority, domestic supply 
municipal but including agricultural irrigation 
consumption of less than 10,000 gallons per day; 
'liiecond, any use that involves consumption of less than 
,000 gallons per day; third, power production; fourth, 
commercial uses; fifth, other use involving 
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consumption of more than 10,000 gallons per day. 59 
Although statutory provisions exist for determining 
use preference among competing applicants there is no 
definition of the rights of permittee as against the 
rights of a riparian owner; and there is no mechanism 
for allocation of the resource in times of scarcity. 
4. New Jersey 
New Jersey's comprehensive permit system, applicable 
to both surface and ground water is administered by the 
Water Policy and Supply Councii. 60 The regulations, 
however, only apply to those areas of the state where 
the Council determines that the surface or ground water 
61 
resources need to be protected. In areas where the 
permit system has been implemented, no person may divert 
or use surface water in excess of 70 gallons per minute 
for any private use, other than a reasonable domestic 
use, without obtaining a permit. 62 A permit is also 
required in such areas for extraction of ground water 
63 in excess of 100, 000 gallons per day. However, existing 
surface water uses are given priority and existing ground 
f . . 64 water uses are exempted rom the permit requirement. 
Surface water permits may be granted for any period 
65 · 
up to 25 years. There are no provisions ·for revocation 
or transfer of permits, or for suspension of water rights 
during periods of water shortage. 
5. South Carolina 
There are no consumptive use controls for surface 
water in south Carolina, but since 1969 the Water Resour 
..,A 
Planning and Coordinating Commission has regulated grou,,~ 
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water. 66 The Commission is authorized to establish 
•capacity use areas'' and require permits in such areas for 
water users who withdraw more than 100,000 gallons per 
day. 67 Permits for nonconsumptive uses may be granted with-
out a hearing, but one is required where a consumptive use 
. 1 d 68 is invo ve. 
In determining whether to grant a permit for a con-
sumptive use, the commission may consider the number of 
persons using an aquifer and the extent, object, and 
necessity of their withdrawals; the nature and size of 
the aquifer; any physical and chemical impairment of the 
water which may affect its use for other purposes, in-
eluding public use; the severity and duration of such 
impairment; the injury to the public health, safety, or 
welfare which might result if such impairment were not 
abated; the kinds of activities to which the various uses 
are related; the importance and necessity of the claimed 
uses; the effect upon other watercourses or ~quifers; 
''any other relevant factors.•• 69 
Permits may issued for up to 10 years, or the 
duration of the existence of the capacity use area, or 
a period sufficient to amortize the applicant's water 
withdrawal and water use facilities. 70 Although permits 
may be renewed, there are no specific standards connected 
with renewals. The Commission may also modify or revoke 
any permit after appropriate notice, provided that such 
the public interest. 71 Permits are trans-
ferable with the approval of the Corruuission and there are 
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no special provisions for dealing with temporary water 
72 
shortages. 
6. Wisconsin 
In Wisconsin, the Division of Environmental Protect1· on, 
a part of the state Natural Resources Board, is the primary 
agency for administering state water laws, including water 
quality control, irrigation permits, and permits for di-
version. The legislature enacted a limited permit system 
74 in 1935 after a severe drought. The act was amended in 
1967 and 1969, and provided for diversion of surplus water 
from a stream to maintain the water level of any navigable 
lake or stream. Non-surplus water may be diverted for 
punposes of agriculture or irrigation "but no water shall 
be diverted to the injury of public rights in the stream 
or to the injury of any riparian located on the stream" 
unless consent is given. 75 
A permit is required for either agriculture or 
. . t. 76 irriga ion. The application must state times of di-
. t d 1 f d' . 77 version, amoun s, an pace o iversion. The permit 
must be issued if surplus water exists, or if there is 
r 
no surplus water, when affected riparians have consented, 
5 
The Department is required to review annually all permits 
issued since 1957. A permit may be revoked if the per-
mitted use if found to be detrimental to other riparians. 
Iron ore mining has been declared to be in the public 
interest, and water can be diverted for this consumptive 
because it is a "public purpose", and a permit must be 
80 
applied for. The water can be transported to another 
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watershed where the operations occur. Further, 
in passing on the application, the Department weighs 
the public rights in the stream against the public 
benefits from the mining. The legislature has further 
declared that persons engaged in mining must be assured 
of adequate and continuous supplies of water before large 
82 
capital investments are made for mills or plants. In 
upon an application for a permit for the diversion 
of consumptive use of water for mining, the Department 
must weigh the public rights in the stream which may be 
adversely affected, against the public benefits which will 
from the proposed operation outweigh the public 
in the stream, the permit is to be issued. Only 
riparians within the area of prospective injury are en-
titled to notice and hearing on the mining water use 
1 . . 83 app 1cat1.on. An injured riparian owner may contest the 
·,,issuance at the hearing, or he may within three years 
t . f ' d t' 84 ac 1.on o inverse con emna 1.on. The consent 
riparian owners is not, however, required in order 
have a permit issued. In addition, applicant is en-
condemn adversely affected riparian rights. 85 
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C. The Constitutionality of State Consumptive Water Use 
Regulations ---
The primary goal of any shift in water law would be to 
fully control water resources to acheive maximum beneficial 
use by creating an administration and permit system to reg-
ulate water use, impoundments, and to control flooding. 
The major problem lies not in organizational structure 
and procedure, however, but in the constitutional objection 
to taking water use property rights from existing riparian 
users without just compensation. Precisely, water regulation 
is either a taking, constitutionally requiring compensation, 
or it is a valid exercise of state police power, in which 
case no compensation is required. Although every attempt 
to regulate use of property is in a sense a ''taking" and 
"necessarily speaks as a prohibition,• 86 police power 
measures relating to the use of property tend to impair 
or 
of 
destroy those interests included in the general concept 
87 property. State attempts to abrogate or alter the 
existing riparian doctrine of water use rights have met 
with stiff opposition, both at public forums and in the 
courts, and it can only be assumed that the same opposition 
83 
will accur in any other state attempting a similar change. 
1. Riparian Rights as Property 
Of particular concern in any attempt to establish 
an understanding of the relationship between the police 
power and riparian rights is the property nature of 
99 
~tparian use itself. A riparian right to water is a right 
use of the water, not a right to the corpus of the 
In addition, the property interest in the riparian 
has been recognized in three distinct areas, the 
of access to water, the right to continued flow of 
ter, and the right to use of the water. 89 
Justice Story early declared that riparian owners, 
not the general public, were the possessors of rights 
of watercourses and the use of water: "The 
stream existing for the benefit of the land 
which it flows, is an incident annexed, by o-
ration of law, to the land itself.•• 90 Justice Story's 
inion reflects the traditional nineteenth century view 
at a property right is an independent and isolated en-
and that an owner may do with his property rights 
wished, subject only to the restrictions of common 
nuisance and trespass doctrines. 
91 Although remnants of this notion still appear the 
and is toward a more flexible notion of property rights 
gives the public a vested interest in property use 
in certain instances equals or surpasses the private 
This is evidenced in changing judicial and leg-
attitudes toward the nature of land as a concept. 
longer is the idea generally accepted that land's only 
is to enable the owner to make a profit from its 
to use it in a way that might be harmful to the 
public interest. 93 Indeed, the new attitude is 
in state legislation protecting natural areas 
94 for regulation of development. This represents 
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a policy of integrating both public and private interests 
in establishing a "best use" of natural resourced, a sup-
position almost entirely antagonistic to Justice Story's 
opinion. 
Once the property factor in riparian use is seen in 
an interdependent network of competing uses, "an amended 
concept of property rights suggests a reformulation of the 
law of takings.•• 95 The new doctrine of public rights and 
interest provides a contervailing measure which would 
validate legislation as a police power regulation rather 
than classify the legislation as an exercise of eminent 
domain requiring compensation. As one commentator has 
declared: 96 
Although the simple right to the use of 
water may be a property right, there remains 
the substantial problem of whether the elaborate 
legal doctrine which the courts have formulated 
to govern the enjoyment of the usufructury right 
can itself be described as property. 
In this instance, however, the very fact of 
judicial silence seems to be evidence that they 
are not property. 
This suggests that a property right exists in usufruc-
tury use, but that a similar property right does not exist 
in the judicial rules promulgated to define and protect 
riparian uses. By analyzing the property interest se-
parately in this manner, legislative alteration of the 
existing legal structure supporting water use may not be 
as fraught with constitutional snages as at first glance, 
Nevertheless, judicial rules and the uses they protect are 
not entirely inseparable, and an attack on one invariably 
.......... ______________ ..., 
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an attack on the other. However, the advantage of 
'ewing riparian rights from such a perspective diminishes 
~ concept of usufructury use from the traditional status 
a full property right to something less, a quasi-property 
such a reduction provides additional weight to the 
position that modification or termination of riparian 
hts by regulation is a valid exercise of police power. 
The Taking Issue 
The recent literature and court cases attest to 
judicial efforts to employ a meaningful and con-
test for determining where police power measures 
97 
compensation for loss of use of property. No 
tests have been listed and described 
98 the commentators. Characterized by minimum pred-
ability, the decisional law is confusing, rhetorical 
99 patternless. In addition, since courts are aware 
of a firm taking test, judicial statements 
prefaced by the caveat that each case must be 
Before a court can properly apply a test to determine 
or not an exercise of police power constitutes 
domain or regulation, the relationship between 
police power and the area involved must be examined 
see if that area is outside the circumscribed bounds 
legitimate police activity. Having been developed to 
lude everything essential to the public health, safety, 
11 
I 
I' 
102 
and welfare to permit state interference whenever demanded 
by the public interest, the standard for constitutional re-
view of police power legislation was delivered in 1894:100 
To justify the state in interposing its 
authority in behalf of the public, it 
must appear, first, that the interests of 
the public. .require such interference; 
and, second, that the means are reasonably 
necessary for the accomplishment of the 
purpose, and not unduly oppressive on 
individuals. 
After considering whether the regulation falls within 
an appropriate area of police power concern, the court must 
examine the legislative means adopted to effectuate the 
regulatory intent. Using a test of rational relationship, 
courts are reluctant to question legislative wisdom, and 
unless "no state of facts could exist to justify such a 
statute", the statute is presumptively valid and shielded 
from judicial inquiry. 101 
Since the criteria of public purpose and rational 
relationship of legislative means to ends have been ex-
eluded almost entirely from judicial consideration, the 
third area laid down in Lawton v. Steele of individual 
regulatory burden has become the nucleus of the dispositve 
constitutional test. This burden most often has been 
translated into economic loss in the form of a diminution-
in-value test. 
Most state police power regulations that restrict 
property or activity impose little or no observable econom~ 
loss on those regulated, and the regulations are generallY 
103 
assailable if they do not substantially erode private 
102 
operty values. In addition, when economic loss re-
from regulation and there is the high public in-
erest in having the activity curtailed, then the element 
general welfare validates the regulation. The cat-
of such cases stretches over a broad spectrum of 
activities from alcohol production and prostitution104 
d b · of trash. 105 O th th h d the out oor urning n e o er an, 
vironmental land use regulations are prone to constitutional 
only because they seek to prevent cost ex-
rnalizations that courts do not customarily recognize, 
t also because they drastically curtail the market value 
private property, posing a sharp constitutional conflict 
. . .106 . 'l l private interests. Simi ar y, any 
of consumptive riparian uses would diminish 
.rketable land value, create a new legal category for 
and be an unrecognized and hypothetical public 
Physical Invasion Test 
The Supreme Court first expanded the notion of police 
government intrusion on the absolute-
107 Ss of private property, in the case of Mugler v. Kansas. 
Mugler opinion stands for the constitutional proposition 
t police power regulations do not constitute compensable 
no direct governmental appropriation 
the property, where use is absolutely impaired, and where 
104 
the regulation has a significant relationship to the public 
welfare. 108 Mugler amplied a position taken earlier by Mr. 
Justice Harlan stating that "taking" was necessarily con-
comitant with acquiring possession or title to that which 
109 
was regulated. 
(b) Harm-Benefit and Diminution-In-Value Tests 
While Mr. Justice Harlan viewed the difference between 
a police power regulation upon property use and the public 
taking of property as a difference in the kind regulation, 
Mr. Justice Holmes viewed the distinction as one of degree. 
Announcing the doctrinal transition in Pennsylvania Coal 
110 Co. v. Mahon, Holmes created a new set of criteria by 
h . h . d h . 111 w ic to JU get e issue: 
One consideration in determining whether .limitations 
on private property, to be implied in favor of the 
police power, are exceeded, is the degree in which 
the values incident to the property are diminished 
from the facts of the particular case. 
The general rule, at least, is that if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking 
for which compensation must be paid. 
In determining whether there has been a diminution 
in values incident to property under the police 
power as to require an exercise of eminant domain 
and the payment of compensation, the greatest 
is given to the judgment of the legislature, but 
is always open to interested parties to contend 
the legislature has gone beyond its juristictional 
power. 
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition 
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire 
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way 
of paying for the charge. 
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Because of the crucial significance of this decision as 
genesis of all subsequent taking cases, the background and 
case are worth examining. The case concerned the 
coal fields and the tendency of mine shafts to 
lapse when abandoned. Termed mine subsidence, the effect 
to remove support from under towns and cities of the 
hracite region. The Pennsylvania legislature responded to 
problem by passing the Kohler Act of 1921, which made unlaw-
the mining of coal so as to cause the subsidence of any 
'lding, structure, or transportation route within the limits 
a designated class of municipalities. 
Mahon and his wife resided in one of these restricted 
Forty years earlier the coal company had owned the 
on which they lived but the company subsequently 
surface rights to another party, who in turn sold to 
1917. The original deed and Mahon's contained a 
of mineral rights by the coal company and included 
of any future claim against the coal company for 
injury or property damages. Mahon brought suit seek-
permanent injunction. Holmes, reversing the Pennsylvania 
declared the Kohler Act unconstitutional and 
Applying a balancing test of extent of public harm if 
area is left unregulated against the diminution in value 
thing if regulated, Holmes stated that the effect on the 
would be slight if the act were invalid and that the 
106 
value of the coal company's reserves, if the act were valid 
' 
would be reduced beyond an acceptable level. In other wora 
s' 
"if the result of the regulation is to achieve a benefit for 
the community, compensation must be paid; but if it is to 
terminate a harmful activity, no compensation is necessary. 
Furthermore, implicit in the harm-benefit analysis lies the 
concept of reciprocity -- that the regulation is justifiable 
so long as those regulated share to some degree in the benefit* 
of the restriction. 113 
Harm and benefit may be regarded as opposite sides of 
the same coin, but harm imposed by private property use prov' 
an obvious judicial analog to nuisance, and therefore be-
comes more readily acceptable as part of any balancing equati~; 
When police power relies on the nuisance factor (eliminating 
a public harm), the economic value of the activity can be 
virtually destroyed, 114 but if the activity is not a nuisancf 
or can not be characterized as spillover (or producing public 
harm), then the traditional test of diminution-in-value is 
used, combined with the factor of extent to which the property 
can be put to some other use, not necessarily the most pro-
fitable.115 This analysis posits the doctrine that no pro-
perty rights exist in a nuisance or spillover-producing 
activity. 
Using the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal as a touch-
stone, the courts began to validate police power regulations 
in land and property use areas whenever public health, safeey 
107 
general welfare demanded. The result produced many 
'isions which sought to determine the degree or per-
that could be imposed upon property owners 
compensation was necessary. 116 A particular 
in the inability of courts to arrive at a 
ridard definition of property base for the diminition 
"The degree of loss inquiry apparently attempts 
personal burden imposed upon property owners, 
/ it does so only by viewing arbitrary subdivisions of 
d
. .,118 hol ings. If a court views only the reg-
restricted part of an area, it will necessarily 
that there is a greater percentage loss than if 
the entire area. For example, substantial di-
may be sustanied in an attack on riparian reg-
tion if intense development of an unregulated area is 
On the other hand, if the diminution evaluation 
an entire area, regulated and unregulated, an 
property base may compel invalidation 
regulation. 119 
Seldom, however, does a court only consider either the 
'nution-in-value or the harm-benefit approach in its 
the taking problem. More often the inquiry es-
balance between private loss and public interest, 120 
two tests together. Public interest, further-
, has been couched in terms of preventing public harm 
just any interest the public might have, which may 
be defined to include benefits. The definitional 
108 
relationship between the regulation and the thing regulated 
' 
then, returns to that given by Holmes in Pennsylvania Coa1. 
substantial diminution can occur through regulation if non-
regulation would produce a public harm. In addition, police 
power concerns more than just noxious uses of private 
property. Zoning, for instance, relies on police pdwer to 
regulate the compatible location of non-noxious uses by es-
tablishing "enforcible priorities between incompatible uses 
in the interest of the general welfare.• 121 In like manner, 
as the need becomes recognized as it was in zoning, a leg-
islature may choose to establish water use priorities. 
{c) The Residuum Test 
A corollary approach to the standard diminution test 
provides an alternative perspective for viewing degree of 
loss imposed by gegulation. The residuum test has two 
variants, each of which may yield a different result. If 
a court looks only to residual beneficial use left after 
regulation, so that the land may have a number of economically 
profitable uses (even if marginal and/or inconsistent with 
prior use), the regulation may be upheld as a valid exercise 
f h 1 . 122 o t e po ice power. However, if the residual use is 
viewed in terms of reasonable rate of return for permitted 
remaining uses, taking into account prior use, surrounding 
uses, amd market conditions, a court may determine that the 
regulation has taken too much and may require that compensat 
be paid. 
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Which branch of the residuum test to employ rests with 
e perceived relationship of the regulated activity to the 
blic interest. As the first residuum approach permits 
of an encroachment on private property, and hence more 
taking without compensation, that test should be u-
lized when non-regulation would result in public harm, 
t by defining public interest in terms of "harms", ex-
. fl 'b'l't b . t l' 1 · 123 aordinary exi ii y can e given o po ice power regu ation. 
e other approach relies more heavily on market profitability 
remaining uses. If the residual use can not realize a 
return, then the regulation is invalid. Sign-
such factors as public harm and externalization 
sts are afforded minimum weight in this analysis, while 
component of private property is given great consideration. 
This second of the residum approaches tends to parallel 
implicit property right definition, but the 
private property, without the internalization 
costs, even if the externalization is a public 
an anachronism in an era when the public interest 
,s become critically involved with private resources usage. 
ever, not_ al]'. takings question should be decided by the 
test of the first residuum approach. All public 
(or benefits) do not necessarily outweigh private 
124 If the contrary were so, and as Plater suggests, 
state would prevail in every instance of confrontation. 
necessity, the residuum approach must be subjective in 
the delicate balance between public interest 
institution of private property. 
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(d) The Diminution-Balancing Test 
The movement in analysis and theory of the taking 
problem evidences a definite shift toward an economic per-
t . 125 · h' h . t 1 d bl' ' spec ive, in w ic priva e ass an pu ic gain are 
quantified according to real loss or gain, administrative , 
and demoralization costs. But the economic analysis is not 
an end in itself; rather, it provided a frame of reference 
from which to view a complex issue. With the added factor 
of fairness, this economic diminution-balancing approach 
avoids the paradoxes of a harm-benefit approach and accounts 
for societal need not explicit in the diminution test. This 
test proposes minimum total social costs while recognizing 
"both the costs that private uses impose upon the public 
and individual losses that government action causes." 126 
The judicial inquiry requires two steps to determine 
if compensation is necessary. First, no private loss is 
excessive if, balanced against the public, it is less than 
the costs it would impose on others, whether public costs 
resulting from unrestricted uses exceed or are less than 
. 127 private property losses caused by government regulations. 
The suggestion here goes to the nature of private property 
rights in relation to public rights: that a public trust 
doctrine operates to control the property rights distribution 
wherever the public and private conflict and public costs 
h . 128 are greater tan private costs. In economic terms, 
111 
test imposes internalization costs on a private property 
er whose use of his property can be classified as a harm-
externality. 
"The first stage inquiry is only minimum review, and 
converse proposition that any regulation imposing more 
it prevents is ipso facto invalid does not 
Further, excessiveness of individual loss 
measured solely in terms of contervailing public 
When private loss is less than public gain, the 
stage dimininution analysis may still be controlled 
question of fairness when combined with the utilitarian 
first part of the test. 
Certainly it must be emphasized that none of these 
ories alter or remove the necessity for compensation 
n government exercises its power of eminant domain and 
'ns actual title to property, when regulations are ar-
rary or unreasonable, 130 or when private loss so out-
ghs public gain that an obvious inequite would result. 
h alternative test provided a constitutional safeguard 
private property rights while recognizing that the public 
a vested interest in the use of private property. 
The Constitutionality of Changes in Water Law Systems 
In the past, because of the important relationship of 
r to the public welfare, the United States Supreme Court 
generally upheld state regulation of water based on the 
ice power. 131 The Court has rejected the assertion that 
112 
each riparian owner has a vested right in the use of unim-
paired and uncontaminated flowing waters and instead has 
held that every state is free to change its law governing 
riparian ownership and to permit the allocation of flowing 
waters for such purposes as it may deem best. 132 
A number of state courts have also upheld systems 
altering the existing uses of riparian owners. The Kansas 
Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 133 upheld 
the validity of that state's new appropriation law against 
the objection that the property of riparian owners was taken 
without due process of law. The court indicated that the 
rights of the riparian owners were always subject to modificat' 
by the legislature to the extent required by the conditions 
d t f th 1 . k . . I H d ' l34 an wans o e peop e. Li ewise, in n re oo River, 
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld sections of a statute which 
redefined "vested rights" and preserved the riparian rights 
only to the extent of their use at the time of its enactment 
or shortly prior thereto. The constitutionality of the Orego~ 
Code, regulating both used and unused rights, was upheld by 
the Ninth Circuit in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement co. 135 
113 
state Regulation of Consumptive Water Use in Kentucky 
---
Kentucky made the first significant legislative 
hange in its riparian system in 1954. The droughts of 
he two preceding years caused many farmers to divert 
from nearby streams and lakes in order to satisfy 
water needs. The increased use of riparian water 
for a more satisfactory definition 
136 
riparian rights in Kentucky. With this in mind, 
e legislature set forth in the 1954 act a basic statement 
the rights of landowners in such waters. 137 The 
also provided for the Legislative Research Com-
to make a thorough study of all problems relating 
water resources and to report its findings to the 1956 
The act applied to "public water" which included con-
ined surface water and ground water, but not diffused 
Section 3 of the act set forth the rights 
landowners to use the public waters of the state. The 
t provided that the use of water by a riparian owner for 
purposes would have priority over other uses and 
that riparian owners "shall have a right to make 
h reasonable use of the water for other than domestic 
poses as will not deny the use of such water to other 
ers for domestic purposes or impair existing uses of 
heretofore established, or unreasonably in-
with a beneficial use by other owners." Finally, 
allowed riparians under certain conditions to im-
water on their land as long as this would 
114 
not injure the rights of other users. 
In 1966 the older act was replaced by a more compre-
138 hensive statute, KRS chapter 151. This legislation, 
attempts to deal with the state's water resources on a 
coordinated and comprehensive basis. Comsumptive uses of 
water, as well as the construction of dams and impound-
ments are gegulated by the agency. In addition, the 
legislation authorized water resources planning and con-
struction for flood control and water development purposes. 
1. Administrative Structure 
The Department for Natural Resources and Environmental 
. d . . h 139 Protection a ministers t e act. Originally, the Division 
of Water performed adjudicatory and planning functions. 
The first five years of the Division's operation concentrated 
on the gathering of data and the study of federal water 
plans. The data collected was designed to provide the 
factual basis necessary to coordinate the planning for 
140 Kentucky's water. The Division's most important function 
was implementation of the state's water plans, and it was 
empowered to issue permits for the use of water in Kentucky. 
The 1974 General Assembly transferred the Division's reg-
ulatory powers to the Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection and the Commissioner of that agency, 
KRS 151.330 (1) created the water Resources Authority 
of the Commonwealth. This agency consists of the governor, 
115 
e commissioner of Natural Resources and Environmental 
otection, the secretary for finance and administration, 
commissioner of health, the commissioner of commerce, 
e commissioner of agriculture, the attorney general, the 
department of transportation, the commissioner 
fish and wildlife resources, and the commissioner of 
The Authority is "empowered to coordinate the pro-
of all state agencies in the conservation, develop-
and wise use of public water," 143 and to simultane-
"promote the beneficial and proper distribution of 
144 
throughout the state." 
A special revolving trust fund, known as the Water 
Fund, has been established, from which the Water 
Authority is authorized to make loans and expend-
145 
ures. The loans are available to any county, city, 
er district, watershed conservance district, or other 
vernmental subdivision, 146 their interest is determined 
the Authority, and they must be secured. 147 In addition, 
Authority is authorized to issue revenue bonds for the 
pose of paying all or part of such projects. 148 
Another important function of the Water Resources Au-
ity is to contract with agencies of the federal govern-
, primarily the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in order 
1 . f d 1 . 149 supp y space in e era reservoirs. 
The Department for Natural Resources and Environmental 
ection and the Water Resources Authority are only two 
116 
of the many governmental agencies which affect the use and 
development of water resources in Kentucky. The governor's 
cabinet possesses some planning responsibility over water 
150 
resources at the state level, while a variety of in-
stitutions exercise authority at the local levei. 151 
2. Consumptive Use Permits 
In its declaration of policy, the Kentucky Water 
Resources Act declares that "The advancement of the safety, 
happiness and welfare of the people and the protection of 
property require that the power inherent in the people be 
utilized to promote and to regulate the conservation, 
development and most beneficial use of the water resources. 
It is hereby declared that the general welfare requires that 
the water resources of the Commonwealth be put to the bene-
ficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, 
that waste or nonbeneficial use of water be prevented, 
and that the conservation and beneficial use of water be 
exercised in the interest of the people. 11152 
This policy is implemented by a permit system by 
which the Department regulates diversions and consumptive 
f bl . t 153 uses o pu 1c wa er. According to KRS 151.120 (1) 
"public waters" include "[w]ater occuring in any stream, 
lake, ground water, subterranean water or other body of 
water in the Commonwealth which may be applied to any 
useful or beneficial purpose.'' However, neither diffused 
surface water, as defined in KRS 151.100 (5), or water 
of left standing in pools in a natural stream when the floW 
117 
d d d bl . t 154 stream has cease, are regar e as pu ic wa ers. 
KRS 151.140 declares that ''no person, business, industry, 
f 
country, water district, or other political subdivision'' 
withdraw, divert or transfer public water unless a permit 
first obtained form the Department. Permit application 
'cedures are simple and expeditious. Fermi ts are usually 
'ued after an inspection by the agency to determine whether 
applicant's proposed use is consistent with the statutory 
155 irements. When the circumstances warrant, the Depart-
may allow less water than the applicant requested, and 
be amended by either the Department or the permittee. 
151.180 provide that "any person aggrieved" by an order, 
~rmination, regulation or ruling of Department personnel 
appeal to the Commissioner. This proceeding calls for a 
quasi-judicial hearing. Public notice must be given and 
hearing is open to the public. The Department may issue 
enas, administer oaths, and examine witnesses. On the 
s of the evidence produced at the hearing, the Commissioner 
findings of facts and conclusions of law and enters a 
order. The Water Resources Act also provides 
judicial review by the agency under KRS 151. 18 0. The 
of this review, however, is limited, and findings of 
by the agency are conclusive if supported by substantial 
There is some question as to what parties can seek ad-
strative or judicial review under the provisions of KRS 
80 and 151.190. Clearly, one whose application for a 
118 
permit is rejected or substantially modified could make 
such an appeal. Arguable, exempted riparian users as Well 
as existing permit holders would also have standing as 
"aggrieved persons'' since their interests are specifically 
protected by the statute. 157 It is less clear whether 
another applicant whose permit has not yet been granted can 
avail himself of these provisions to challenge the pending 
permit application of another. Finally, it is uncertain~ 
what extent other governmental agencies, conservation 
organizations or private citizens may qualify as "aggrieved 
persons" in order to protect public interests within the 
purview of the statute. 158 
Once a permit is issued, the water user must keep 
accurate records of all water withdrawn, diverted or trans-
ferred and submit periodic reports to the Department. 159 
The agency, may after warning, order the suspension or revo-
cation of a permit if the owner fails to comply with the 
conditions of his permit or with provisions of the Act of 
1 d d 1 1 . 160 re ate or ers, rues or regu ations. The Department 
may enforce the provisions of the Act in a number of ways. 
The Department has general authority to adopt rules and 
1 . 161 d . d 162 t th regu ations an to issue or ers to carry ou e 
provisions of the Act. 
The Department may issue a cease and desist order agai 
one who makes a withdrawal, diversion or transfer of public 
water without obtaining the necessary permit. 163 
r~f The agen~, 
may also institute court proceedings to enforce its orders, 
119 
reover, unauthorized diversions of public water, 165 as 
ll as other violations of the Act, may subject the vio-
civil penalties of up to $1000 per day. 166 
The scope of the Department's regulatory power over 
blic water is substantially limited by a series of ex-
tions found in KRS 151.140. These include (1) domestic 
(2) agricultural users, including irrigators; (3) 
s exempted by administrative regulation; (4) stream gen-
plants; and (5) water injected undergrouns in con-
with oil and gas production. 
The exemption for domestic use reflects the high prior-
given to such uses under riparian doctrine. KRS 151.100 
''domestic use" as ''the use of water for ordinary 
purposes, and drinking water for poultry, live-
domestic animals.'' Domestic uses are often ex-
1 . . 167 b .. regu ation in Eastern states ecause it is 
en impractical to regulate numerous small users; individ-
domestic users collectively account for a relatively 
11 amount of the total water demand; and regulation of 
icipal waterworks and other public water suppliers can 
168 
ectively control domestic consumption in urban areas. 
The exemption for agriculture is more significant. 
in 1970 averaged about seven million 
169 25,000 acres of land. Tobacco is 
principal crop using irrigation waters, and if a drought 
occurs, some 36,000 acres would require 4,320,000,000 
of water. 170 Maryland is the only other state which 
1.2 0 
specifically exernpts 171 useso In Kentucky 
the exemption is due larg·ely to the efforts of the Farm 
Bureau which viev1s ir1i th extreme alarm any regulation of 
farm activities. Nevertheless, this exemption is a major 
weakness in the regulatory scheme. 
No permit is req11ired 11 if t.he a.n1ount of water rNith-
drawn, diverted or transferred is less than the amount 
established by regulation.'' This exemption was created as 
a result of an amendment in 1974 to KRS 151.140 requested 
by the agency. T'l'1e age.ncy n.otv exempt.s from the pe~r:-mi t 
system those who use less than 10,000 gallons per day. 
Similar provisions appear in Iowa and Florida water reg-
, . 172 
ulatory legislation. 
The 1966 act orginally exempted many manufacturing 
and industrial users from the permit requirements, provided 
that the water was returned in substantially the same quan':: 
and condition. as vit1en it v1a s wi thclrav,1n ~ This provision wss 
repealed in 1972, leaving only stream-generating facilities 
still exempt. 
Finally, the use of water for secondary recovery op-
erations con·tir1u.es t~o 1.~eraair1 e·:Kemp·t fro1n the permit require-
ments~ 
The exact nature of a water right under Kentucky's 
permit system is somewhat unclear. For purposed of il 
tion, it will be compared with water rights under the 
common-lav1 ripa.rian_ syste1n and pr·ior appropriation. 
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In the East, surface water rights are based on owner-
of riparian land and rights to ground water arise 
the ownership of overlying land. Under prior appropriat-
rights are derived from beneficial use of the 
t 1 d h . 173 no an owners ip. In Kentucky, beneficial 
'se rather than ownership of land, appears to be the basis 
the permit right. KRS 151.170 states that no permit 
a responsible applicant who has es-
blished an amount of water for which he has a need for 
purpose." There is no requirement in the statute 
applicant be a riparian or overlying owner. In 
dition, municipalities, which are considered nonriparians 
are specifically mentioned as eligible 
Moreover, the statute does not suggest that 
or overlying owners are to be given any preference 
the granting of permits. A modified watershed rule, 
applied: KRS 151.200 (2) provides that permits 
a use beyond the watershed must be authorized 
the Water Resources Authority. 
The riparian right is usufructory in nature. The 
ter user merely has the right to make a reasonable use 
the available surface water. Under each of three 
on law" ground water doctrines, the water right is 
Under prior appropriation, however, 
water right is much more specific. The appropriator's 
tis fixed in terms of time, location and quantity. 
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Each of these prior appropriation features is found in the 
Kentucky statute. KRS 151.170 (1) provides that permits 
be specific in terms of quantity, time, place and rate of 
diversion, transfer, or withdrawal. 
Water rights under the prior appropriation system are 
perpetual in nature although they can be lost or abandoned 
175 through nonuse. Riparian rights in a sense are, also 
perpetual since they are appurtenant to the land. On the 
other hand, the continuing right to make a particular use 
of water (except for domestic uses) is of indefinite duratio~ 
under the reasonable use rule since changing circumstances 
may compel an existing user to modify his water use or cease 
it altogether in order to accommodate new users. Most 
permit systems in the East place durational limits on the 
. d . . d' 1 176 h K t k permits an require perio ic renewa. Te en uc y 
statute, however, does not specify any particular time 
limit, although it is doubtful that they are intended to be 
perpetual. 
The transfer of water rights apart from a sale of the 
land is difficult or impossible in most riparian juris-
dictions. While theoretically pos~ible in prior approp-
riation states, in practice it is difficult because the 
177 
rights of junior appropriators must be protected. The 
Kentucky stature is silent on whether permit rights are 
transferable. Presumably the permit would have to be a-
mended pursuant to 151.170 (4) if the place of diversion or 
any other material aspect of the permit were changed as a 
result of the transfer. 
123 
preferences and priorities are two related and often 
In the East temporal priority is not 
Established users have no protection against 
initiation of new uses. As a general rule, there are 
preferential rights to water either. An exception to 
is is the domestic user in the case of surface water. 
the overlying owner to ground water are superior 
those of a nonoverlying user under the American rule and 
e correlative rights doctrine. Use preferences are some-
mes found in prior appropriation jurisdictions, although 
operate somewhat differently than in the East. 17 8 
Priority, however, is very important under prior 
In times of water shortage the rights of 
nior appropriators are superior to those of junior 
. t 179 . . . f d h k ropria ors. Priority is a actor un er t e Kentuc y 
t, but operate's somewhat differently than in the West. 
er prior appropriation, priority determines the re-
water when supply is inadequate to meet 
of all users. In Kentucky, existing users, both 
and unregulated are protected from competition 
Jl1 new users by the provisions of KRS 151.170 (2), which 
tes that a permit application will be granted only if 
proposed use "will not be detrimental to the . rights 
water users . ." and if ''the requested 
is available." Thus, temporal priority 
a factor when a new user seeks to obtain a per-
Once the permit is secured, however, older uses have 
124 
inherent superiority over recently commenced uses. In-
stead, during periods of "drought, emergency, or other 
similar situations requiring a balancing of the rights and 
available water between water users." The Department, with 
the approval of the Water Resources Authority, "may temp-
orarily allocate the available public water supply among 
water users and restrict the water withdrawal rights of 
permit holders until such time as the condition is relieved 
and the best interests of the public are served.''lBO This 
approach differs from both riparianism and prior appropriatfo~.·· 
Under the former, adjustments among users would be make 
according to the dictates of the reasonable use rule; under 
the prior appropriation system, allocation would be made 
on the basis of relative priority. 
The relationship between permit users and unregulated 
riparian users is uncertain in many respects. This promises 
to be troublesome because there are a great number of un-
regulated users in Kentucky due to the many exempted cate-
gories in KRS 151.140. 
What happens when an unregulated riparian owner in-
creases his water use, or makes a new use, and this inter-
feres with a permitee? For example, if a farmer begins to 
make a withdrawal of water for purposes of irrigation, an 
unregulated use, is his right to the water superior to that 
of the permittee if insufficient water is available to accofit'' 
modate fully the needs of both users? If it is determined 
that unregulated users have a preferential right to the 
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ter, permit users who are also riparian to a watercourse 
uld be worse off under the statutory allocation framework 
common law riparian doctrine. Arguably, this 
a taking of property without due process 
law. 
on the other hand if permit holders are given superior 
hts to the water unregulated riparian users might raise 
process issue. A compromise might be proposed 
both the permitee and the riparian user must adjust 
water use in accordance with the reasonable use rule. 
ile this approach seems viable, it is not without problems. 
the permit user is making a nonriparian use, he might 
argue that his riparian rights have been impaired, 
at common law, a nonriparian use is unreasonable and 
be enjoined when it harms a riparian user. On the other 
d, if both the permit user and the unregualted user 
riparian owners, the utility of the permit system it-
be questioned since water allocation formula 
be the same under the statutory system as under 
riparian system. 
Conflicts between regulated and unregulated users 
to be most acute during periods of prolonged 
water shortage conditions. During such periods, 
151.200 (1) allows the Department, with the permission 
Water Resources Authority, to suspend the operation 
permit system and temporarily allocate water on some 
r (but disclosed) basis. This provision states that the 
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Department may "allocate the available public water supply 
among water users" and "restrict the water withdrawal rights 
of permit holders" (emphasis supplied) . This language is 
ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent unless "water users" is 
interpreted as being synonymous with "permit holders." This 
view is supported by KRS 151.140 which states that "nothing 
herein shall interfere with the use of water for agricultural 
and domestic purposed including irrigation." This language 
suggests that the entire act, including the provisions of 
KRS 151.200 (1), are inapplicable to these two exempted 
categories. However, KRS 151.140 merely states that ''no 
permit shall be required" for other classes of exempt uses 
such as small uses, stream generation and oil and gas 
production. Conceivably, the Department may have some 
authority to regulate these uses under KRS 200 (1) during 
periods of water shortage. 
On the whole, the relationship between unregulated 
riparian and permit users in Kentucky needs substantial 
clarification. This clarification should come from further 
legislation, but may well have to be settled instead by 
litigation. Needless to say this issue is a difficult and 
complex one, involving as it does the underlying proprietary 
nature of both riparian ownership and statutory property 
rights. 
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V. Federal Regulatory Powers Over Water Resources 
A. The Constitutional Basis of Federal Regulatory Powers 
Over Water Resources 
Federal regulatory authority over water resources is 
based primarily on the commerce clause of the Federal 
1 
Constitution. The Supreme Court first recognized the 
power of the federal government to regulate navigation and 
2 
general commercial relations in Gibbons v. Ogden; "The 
power of Congress, then comprehends navigation within the 
limit of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation 
may be, in any manner, connected with 'Commerce with foreign 
nations, or among the several states or with the Indian 
tribes.'" The court later stated that the power to regulate 
navigation and commerce permitted the government to keep the 
navigable waters free from obstructions to navigation 
"imposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such obs true-
tions, when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions a.! 
they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil 
3 
for the punishment of offenders.". 
A line of Supreme Court decisions has expanded the 
concept of navigability to allow federal regulation over a 
preponderance of the United States' flowing waters. The 
first test for navigability endorsed by the court was a 
factual one: if the stream was navigable in fact, it was 
navigable for purposes of regulation under the commerce 
4 
clause. Later the court held that nonnavigable water 
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ich affected the navigable capacity of a river was also 
5 
ject to federal regulation, and that a watercourse 
at was nonnavigable in its natural state but capable of 
made navigable by means of "reasonable improvements" 
6 
be considered navigable for jurisdictional purposes. 
test has evolved to the point that, at the present time, 
federal government has the authority to protect its 
navigation in any stream, river or lake that 
a channel for useful commerce, without regard for 
it is navigable in its natural state, or whether it 
7 
uld be made so as a result of reasonable improvement. 
n necessary, the federal government can override contrary 
8 
ate regulations. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
that just compensation be provided to the private 
private property that the federal government 
uisitions for public purposes. However, the federal 
"navigation servitude" on the flow of all 
igable waters and does not have to recognize private 
bperty interests in them. This results without having to 
ovide compensation for so doing·, and this is so irrespective 
private rights in the waters are recognized by 
It is no answer to say that these private owners 
had interests in the water that were recognized by state 
law. We deal here with federal domain, an area which Con-
gress can completely pre-empt, leaving no vested claims that 
c~nstitute 'private property' within the meaning of the 
fifth amendment. 
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The navigation servitude applies not only to governme 
activities which directly contribute to the protection 
or 
maintenance of navigation, but also may extend to such 
related matters as flood control or power production, 
although as a practical matter Congress follows a policy of 
cooperating with the states on water issues and seldom exer-
cises the navigation servitude. 
The general welfare power and the property power have 
also provided constitutional bases for federal activitity 
water resources areas. Concerning the international rivers 
that form boundaries with Canada and Mexico, Congress has 
power to do "whatever is necessary to comply with the trea" 
it makes concerning those rivers to enforce compliance by 
10 
its states and citizens." Consequently, the treaty power 
has been used to justify steps taken to maintain an agreed· 
11 
upon level of an international lake," construction of re-
12 
servoirs on boundary rivers, and projects designed to 
carry out treaty obligations to deliver water to neighborill!) 
13 
countries. 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congreit 
the power to levy taxes "to pay tl;l.e Debts and provide for 
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United State!i, 
This welfare clause has provided the justification for the 
federal government construction and maintenance of reclama~ 
tion works and flood control projects. 
Article 4, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution 
known as the property clause and states: 
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The Congress shall have Power to dispose 
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property be-
longing to the United States; and nothing in 
this constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or 
of any particular state. 
The property clause applies mainly to unapprppriated, 
-navigable waters found on public lands in western states. 
the exception of Texas, the federal government at one 
owned all the land, 'and the water therein, of the 
When the states entered the 
n, this did not affect water on public lands and con-
the United States is still the owner and in 
such waters. 
A final possible source of federal authority is the war 
It is little used for water resource purposes, but 
~ennessee Valley Authority project was at least partly 
ld on this basis. 
Federal Water Resource Legislation 
1. The Reclamation Act 
The Reclamation Act of 1902 Js the legislative founda-
for reclamation projects in the United States. This 
Was designed to provide for the building of irrigation 
from the proceeds of public land sales in the sixteen 
The water obtained thereby was made 
for use on both public and private lands. Each 
agreed to reimburse his pro rata share of the cost 
nstruction in full within ten years and also to repay 
lly the maintenance costs incurred from his use of the 
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project. To prevent any monopoly on precious water rights 
' 
the act provided that water could not be sold for use on 
more than 160 acres of any one private owner's land, and the 
user had to be a resident on the land. The water rights are 
14 
appurtenant to the land. 
The original act has been modified several times with 
most revisions concerning the repayment provisions. The 
15 
Reclamation Project Act of 1939 provides that any costs 
allocated to flood control and navigation do not have to be 
. 16 
reimbursed, and the Federal Water Project Recreation Act 
provides that one half of the costs allocated to recreation 
and fish-wildlife enhancement do not have to be reimbursed, 
provided that a non-federal public body will agree to 
administer the recreation, fish-wildlife aspect of the 
project, pay the maintenance costs of such, and pay the 
other half of the costs of the project incurred for these 
purposes. 
Section 7 of the original Reclamation Act provides for 
the use of eminent domain in connection with federal reclama-
tion projects, Section 8 is concerned with the role of state 
17 
law in relation to federal power: 
That nothing in this Act shall be construed 
as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way 
interfere with the laws of any State Territory 
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or 
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary 
of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of 
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such 
laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect 
any right of any state or of the Federal Govern 
mentor of any landowner, appropriator, or user 
of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or 
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the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to 
the use of water acquired under the provisions 
of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land 
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, 
the measure, and the limit of the right. 
section 8 has been construed by the Supreme Court as 
rely requiring the United States to comply with state law 
necessary to acquire water rights, "[b]ut 
e acquisition of water rights must not be confused with 
18 
e operation of federal projects. The court later 
restricted the extent to which state law can in-
reclamation projects, emphasizing that "We do not 
that where Congress has provided a system of regu-
ation for federal projects it must give way before an 
19 
'nconsistent state system." 
Although reclamation law was originally limited to 
aling with irrigation, it now applies to power production, 
commercial and industrial uses, as well as to 
20 
and fish-wildlife conservation. As early as 
906, Congress authorized the use of reclamation water for 
<ff • • 
~- •. towns and cities 
21 
projects." 
on or in the immediate vicinity of 
22 
The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 
the federal government.to furnish water for 
nicipalities or other "miscellaneous purposes." Most 
these "miscellaneous purposes" 
elude domestic and industrial supply. 
Under the 1939 act, the federal government has two 
contracting for municipal or other water supplies. 
contract requiring repayment in a maximum of 40 
interest not over 3 1/2 per cent. (The interest 
arges are in theory discretionary, but have been included 
i. 
... 1 
!' I 
, , I 
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in every municipal water supply contract since 1949.) 23 (2) 
Contract to supply water for a period not exceeding 40 y 
ears 
at rates at least sufficient to produce revenue adequate to 
cover annual operation and maintenance costs. 
The 1939 Act also provides that every contract user is 
entitled to renewal of his contract, subject to renegotiatio~ 
of charges and other matters. The federal government gives 
an appropriative right to users during the term of their 
use, "a first right to a stated share or quantity of the 
project's water supply for municipal, domestic, or industrial 
24 
use. 11 
2. The Federal Flood Control Act of 1944 
The first major federal flood control activities began 
with the 
25 
1879 
creations of the Mississippi River Commission in 
26 
and the Missouri River Commission in 1884. Each 
commissioner was assigned the responsibility for developing 
plans to improve the navigability of its respective river 
and to prevent flooding. Federal jurisdiction over flood 
control matters on all navigable rivers began with the 
. 27 
creation of the Inland Waterways Commission in 1908. 
Federal interest in flood control intensified after 
extensive flooding of the Mississippi River early in the 
. ti? 20th Century. The creation of the Tennessee Valley Authorl, 
28 
in 1933 established a new pattern of federal power over 
watercourses and natural resources in order to facilitate 
the full development of a specific river basin area. 
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29 
The Flood Control Act of 1936 designated the U.S. 
corps of Engineers as the primary federal agency in 
dealing with flood control. This act also set forth the 
"ABC requirement" of local involvement and co-operation in 
lood control projects; i.e., that no money will be appro-
riated by the federal government unless the states furnish 
30 
that they will give full cooperation. The 
31 
Control Act of 1944 extended the definition of 
control to include channel and major drainage improve-
and authorized the Corps of Engineers to construct, 
maintain recreation facilities in reservoir 
This act also empowered the Corps to prescribe 
gulations for the use of storage water allocated for flood 
or navigation and to contract for the sale of surplus 
The provisions of the act apply to any reservoir 
with the help of federal funds. 
3. The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention 
Act of 1954. 
Watershed protection encompasses the federal govern-
t's efforts to develop small upstream projects for soil 
sion prevention and flood control, as opposed to the 
nt projects on major watercourses. The primary watershed 
legislation is the Watershed Protection and Flood 
32 
Act of 1954. This act and its amendments set 
h three ways in which the federal government, through 
.s. Department of Agriculture, may help local organizations 
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with small watershed projects: (1) by giving technical 
assistance in building and maintaining projects; (2) giving 
financial assistance; (3) extending long-term credit. 
4. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 
Federal regulation of water as a power source began in 
33 
1896, but piecemeal legislation was the rule until the 
34 
Federal Water Power Act of 1920 established a national 
policy for the use and development of water power on public 
35 
lands and navigable streams. The Federal Water Power Act 
of 1920 established a national policy for the use and 
development of water power on public lands and navigable 
streams. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 put a firm 
federal grip on water power projects by limiting licenses 
for hydroelectric power developments to 50 years and by 
providing for takeover by the federal government at the 
36 
expiration of the original licensed period. More import-
antly, the Act established the Federal Power Commission, 
which was later reorganized by Congress as an independent 
37 
agency. The FPC has the responsibility of properly 
planning and utilizying the nation's valuable water power 
resources. The Commission studies plans for proposed 
federal power projects and makes recommendations. Its main 
power is its control of licensing for the use of sites 
located on watercourses over which Congress has jurisdicti~', 
Two provisions of the Act are of interest because of 
their possible relationship to water supply. The first is 
38 
an amendment that allows th FPC to license all 
a federal hydroelectric power system for non-power purpos 
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d therefore conceivably for water supply purposes. The 
provides for the issuance of licenses which allow the 
39 
to use surplus water from a federal dam. 
5. The Water Supply Act of 1958 
40 
The Water Supply Act of 1958 serves as the primary 
majority of federal water supply and 
activities. The Act is of special importance in 
is designed to look to future water needs - pro-
are made whereby the federal government, through the 
ps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, can incorporate 
ditional storage into a water supply project in anticipation 
future demands. The act allows states or local interests 
contract with the agency involved for storage space in a 
with the stipulation that the state or 
cal interest will pay for the cost of such storage space. 
can be deferrred over the life of the project, up 
years, and can be federally funded up to 30% of the 
ject's total estimated cost. More important, however, is 
fact that the act elevated " ..• water supply from an 
idental function to one of the.primary purposes of reservoir 
41 
struction ... " by the federal government. 
The Water Supply Act specifically allows storage water 
be contracted for by the state or local interests "for 
sent or anticipated future demand or need for municipal 
. 42 
~ndustrial water,'' and implies that the contract 
43 
used for domestic and "other purposes." 
water 
In 
1961 amendment to the Federal Water Pollution 
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Control Act authorizes the storage of water in federal 
44 
reservoirs for the purpose of water quality control, The 
45 
1944 Flood Control Act expressed a change in Congressional 
policy from single purpose impoundments to allowing the 
fullest range of established and potential uses possible 
since that time virtually all federal reservoir projects 
have been multiple-purpose, allowing the storage water in 
them to be earmarked for a variety of potential uses. 
ano 
The administrative procedure for modifying the use of 
water supply storage is not complicated. Each project has 
its own authorizing legislation, which usually consists of 
one sentence in an amendment to a water statute. This 
leaves the agency that built the project pretty much on its 
own in regard to administering the project. Thus there are 
two means by which to change the use of water stored for 
water supply purposes: Persuade the agency in charge of 
project to allow the change in use; or persuade Congress to 
amend the authorizing legislation. Changing the use of 
storage water involves the problems of acquiring the rights 
to use the water for a different purpose; of complying with 
federal and state procedures, which may lead to federal-
state conflicts; of complying with various environmental 
guidelines; and possible disruptions of repayment schedule, 
Every federal reservoir project comes into existence as 
the result of a study analyzing cost-benefit feasibilitY· 
· ces Each project, once authorized, is placed under the auspl 
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of an administrator by the agency in charge of its construe-
tion. Because the authorizing legislation leaves the 
agency that builds a project on its own as far as the adminis-
. tration of the project goes, the administrator will have 
considerable discretion in the operation of the project. 46 
practical matter, the administrator's primary concern 
be to insure that the federal government is repaid 
according to the schedule outlined for the project, and to 
make the cost-benefit ratio of the project as favorable as 
Indeed, the only major concern about the adminis-
tration of a given project by the statute itself is that the 
. 47 be repaid on time. The easiest means by which 
to change the use of water supply storage is thus to convince 
administrator of the particular project involved that 
proposed change in use of the water will enhance, or at 
least not diminish, the cost-benefit ratio and that the 
isting repayment schedule will not be unduly disrupted. 
practical matter, this is probably the only way by 
the use can be converted. In theory a modification of 
e authorized use could also be effected by amending the 
thorizing legislation. Legislat~res are as influenced by 
~nomics as administrative agencies are, however, and if 
cost-benefit study renders a proposed change of use 
ttractive to the administrator of a project, it will most 
ely also render the change unattractive to Congress.) 
There may be a problem in switching the use of con-
cted water to a use not stipulated in the authorizing 
islation of a project. The annual appropriation for 
"'1 
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Corps flood control projects in advanced planning and cons-
truction stages is subject 
part of this appropriation 
48 
to the express condition that " 
no 
shall be used for projects not 
authorized by law." There is also a section in the Water 
Supply Act that requires Congressional approval for modifica 
of a reservoir project which would "seriously affect the 
purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed, 
planned, or constructed, or which would involve major 
49 
structural or operational changes.'' The problem is not 
likely to arise, however, because virtually all recent 
projects are authorized for all conceivable purposes. 
Therefore modification of the use of contracted water from 
them would merely be a switch from one authorized purpose tet 
another, and would not be sufficient enough to require 
Congressional approval. coal conversion will probably fit 
into the category of "industrial" use, a purpose for contract 
water specifically contemplated by the Water Supply Act. 
Apparently, then, all a local interest will have to do to 
change the use of its contracted water storage is apply to 
the agency involved, which may then revise "the existing 
lease or agreement to evidence th~ conversion of its rights 
50 
to the use of the storage." This is apparently so for 
projects build prior to the passage of the Water Supply Act 
as well as for those constructed after 1958. 
The only limitations upon any such change expressed 
the Act is that "all authorized purposes served by the 
project shall share equitably in the benefits of multiple 
149 
51 
construction. At least two cases have held that 
unit of a project cannot serve its principle anti-
purpose, it can be used to advance any other authorized 
52 
of the project. 
The administrative procedure aside, there are problems 
will be encountered in attempting to alter the use of 
ter supply storage. The National Environmental Policy Act 
equires that an environmental impact statement be filed for 
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation 
53 
d other major Federal actions." Courts have applied 
is requirement broadly, with one court declaring that 
triviality of the federal action will not necessarily mean 
54 
o impact statement is required." Coal conversion, with 
ts tremendous water needs and potential for thermal pollution, 
11 assuredly affect the environment enough that a N.E.P.A. 
statement will be required before water supply storage 
converted to its use. In addition, the Water Resources 
55 
anning Act of 1965 authorized the Water Resources 
principles, standards and procedures 
r planning and evaluating federal water and related land 
ource projects. These standards were published in 1971 
56 
became effective October, 1973. The standards state 
objectives: enhancement of national economic development, 
enhancement of the environment. Thus both an economic 
dy and an environmental study are required to change the 
57 
reservoir. The N.E.P.A. impact statement can serve 
economic study, but the environmental study is not to 
a dollars and cents basis, but rather the W.R.C. 
give a detailed procedure for determining the 
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58 
environmental impact. The guidelines require all alter-
59 
native plans to be considered. 
Another problem involves the nature of the rights 
vested in the stored water. The Water Supply Act of 195 8 
leaves the acquisition of rights to the water to be stored 
to the contracting party, who must follow state procedures 
in acquiring them, which is usual done either through 
condemnation proceedings or by negotiated purchase. The 
rights acquired by a local interest may allow the storage 
water to be used for coal conversion or may not, depending 
on what system of water law the state uses. Kentucky water 
law is a sort of modified riparian rights system wherein 
most parties who wish to draw from the state's navigable 
waters must apply for and receive a permit before doing so, 
but with some users exempted from the permit system and 
to use the water on a riparian rights basis. The Kentucky 
permit system is not well drawn and whether a permit holder 
will be allowed to switch the use of the water from the use 
for which he acquired the permit is anybody's guess, and the 
acquired rights .in storage water may vary from project to 
project depending on whether the contracting party is a 
state interest, a local interest operating under a permit, 
or a local interest, with riparian rights. 
There is also the possibility of a federal-state 
conflict in changing ·~ the use of storage water in that le 
is the individual state that specifies the nature of a 
by whicl:l user's rights in the water involved and the means 
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to be acquired, but it is the federal agency 
involved that must approve the change of the use of that 
>water. For example, Kentucky has a statute that would 
'forbid the switch of storage water to coal conversion if 
such would interfere with agriculture, but federal law does 
not accord such paramount rights to farmers. There is also 
a possible, albeit improbable, federal-state conflict if the 
.state should happen to have more stringent environmental 
'standards than the national standards. The outcome of a 
federal-state conflict is unclear. Federally created water 
rights would obviously, in light of the Ivanhoe Irrigation 
District v. McCracken60 and Nebraska v. Wyoming 61 decisions, 
prevail over state-created water rights, but the federal 
>government usually prefers to cooperate with the states in 
water matters. 
6. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 
In addition to regulating the discharge of pollutants 
waters of the United States, Federal water pollution con-
legislation also affects water storage. The 1961 Arnend-
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act62 reads 
survey or planning of any reservoir by the Corps 
Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, or other Federal 
consideration shall be given to inclusion of 
for regulation of streamflow for the purpose of 
quality control, except that any such storage and 
releases shall not be provided as a substitute 
r adequate treatment or other methods of controlling 
source." The 1972 Federal Water Pollution 
ntrol Act Arnendments 63 seem to have directly dealt with 
.e question of whether water stored for water quality 
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purposes can later be converted to some other use: "In the 
case of any reservoir project authorized for construction 
the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation or other 
Federal agency, when the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency determines ... that any storage in such 
project for regulation of streamflow for water quality is 
not needed, or is needed in a different amount, such project 
may be modified accordingly by the head of the·appropriate 
agency, and any storage no longer required for water quali•,; 
', 
may be utilized for other authorized purposes of the proj 
when in the opinion of the head of such agency, such use 
64 
justified " 
Thus there is authorization for modifying the use of 
water quality storage. There are, however, several restric· 
tions. Water stored for water quality is not going to be 
free for coal gasification unless it is not needed for watfr: 
quality control; the federal government is going to have all 
interest in seeing that the water is used for the contractei! 
purpose, an interest that a long history of cases has show~ 
will prevail over any conflicting state or local interests. 
The resolution of the question as to whether the con· 
tracted water is in fact needed for water quality purposes 
may ultimately hinge on when the contract was entered into, 
There have been several amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act since 1961, the most significant 
those of 1972. The 1972 F.W.P.C.A. amendments made one 
significant change in the 1961 act, this being that 
under the 1961 act the need for and value of storage for 
, 
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er quality purposes was determined by the federal agency 
ating the project, since 1972 "the need for, the value 
and the impact of, storage 
11 be determined by the EPA 
for water quality 
65 
Administrator. 
control" 
The 1961 
and the 1972 act taken together have been judicially 
to mean that it is up to the Corps to determine 
e need for water quality storage for projects that were 
the planning or authorization stage as of the passage 
the 1972 amendments, but for the EPA Administrator to 
termine if the project was not beyond the authorization 
66 
age as of 1972. That the Corps and EPA might have 
fferent views as to whether storage water is needed for 
ter qualtiy purposes hardly needs elaboration. 
The 1972 amendment also places some limitations on the 
dification of use of water quality storage. These are 
at if water quality was to provide between 15 and 25% of 
of a project, water stored for water qualtiy may 
another authorized project only with Congressional 
roval; if water quality was to provide more than 25% of 
e projected benefits of the project, the water earmarked 
water quality purposes may not be used for any other 
67 
under any conditions. If water quality was to 
less than 15% of the benefits of a project, the 
water may be converted to some other use upon the 
Administrator's determination (or, presumably, the 
's determination for projects beyond the authorization 
ge as of 1972) that the storage is not needed for water 
lity purposes. 
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In addition, the same problems with 
the necessary water rights and complying 
regard to acqui . 
ring 
with the N.E.P,A, 
impact statement and Water Resources Council standards 
exist for changing the use of water supply storage also 
pertain for changing the use of water quality storage. 
N.E.P.A. requires notice to the public with regard 
environmental impact statements, so challenges from environ, 
mental groups concerning conversion from water quality to 
coal gasification are inevitable. The major pollution 
problem arising from water being used for gasification 
be thermal pollution. The possible detrimental effect on 
water quality include reducing species' diversity or abundru 
reducing capacity of water to hold disssolved oxygen, and 
indirect effects on aquatic organisms, such as changes in 
metabolic rate, respiration, behavior and migration, 
rates, growth and reproduction, and increased susceptibility 
68 
to parasites and diseases. Thus even if the water is not 
needed to reduce the effects of pollution, the fact that ~t 
use of it for gasification may add to pollution may prohibit 
its being used for that purpose. 
C. Federal Regulatory Powers and Coal Conversion. 
Federal water resource policies will undoubtedly have 
significant impact on the development of a coal conversioa 
industry in Kentucky. The construction of physical fac 
such as levees, dams and reservoirs under various flood 
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ontrol programs or the Water Supply Act of 1958 will 
ay substantially increase (or decrease) the availability 
f water at a particular site. In some cases, part of the 
ater impounded in these facilities could be utilized for 
conversion purposes. 
However, some aspects of federal regulatory policies 
place serious constraints on the development of an 
independent water allocation program at the state level. 
or example, the state could not authorize diversions 
der its water permit system that interfered with federal 
navigation. This may prove trouble-
e in connection with the location of large-scale coal 
Ohio River and its tributaries. 
reover, thermal discharges by coal conversion facilities 
will be subject to existing federal water pollution 
1 . 1 t. 69 eg1.s a 1.on. 
No state water allocations system can ignore the 
istence of federal powers in the water resources area. In 
decade or so there has been an increasing 
water resources development as a national 
tendency 
70 problem. 
's does not mean that a state has no voice with respect 
'the internal allocation of water resources within its 
but it does suggest that the various states and 
federal government will have to coordinate their res-
tive 1· · · 71 
· po 1.c1.es 1.n the water resources area. Common goals 
priorities should be agreed upon and pursued in a co-
ative fashion. If the federal government maintains its 
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commitment to a policy of energy independence and contin ' 
Ue11 
to regard the development of a coal conversion industry as} 
a means of achieving this goal, the chances for agreement 
on a water allocation program for this purpose seem very 
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conclusion 
water Allocation Systems and Coal Conversion 
coal gasification and liquefaction facilities will 
large quantities of water both for cooling purposes 
for use as a raw material in some of the conversion 
Therefore, the feasibility of coal conversion 
of meeting the nation's future energy needs 
ends, at least in part, on the availability of an ade-
te and dependable water supply in areas where such 
ilities will be located. This involves legal as well 
technological considerations. Not only must the nee-
ary water be physically available, but coal conversion 
ilities must be able to obtain a sufficient legal in-
justify the huge capital outlays that such 
enterprise requires. 
This study has examined three systems of water all-
in order to determine which of them is most res-
to the needs of the coal conversion industry. 
first was the traditional riparian doctrine that pre-
United State&. The second was prior 
is found in most of the western states. 
third approach, state regulation under a permit system, 
a hybrid which contained features of both riparianism 
appropriation. 
Each of these systems of water allocation has its 
ntages and disadvantages. The riparian system, es-
surface water is concerned, is probably 
I 1: 
, I 
'1 
1 ·1 
,. , I 
I! ' 
I ' I 
,11 
1 
I.· j 
i .,,1,1 
I ; ! 
·''I li,·ij 
,1· 1 1, 
162 
too restrictive for the needs of large-scale industrial 
users such as the coal conversion industry. Moreover , 
water rights under the riparian reasonable use rule are 
uncertain and insecure. On the other hand, water rights 
under the prior appropriation system are secure, at least 
in the case of senior appropriators, but the system is 
inflexible in many respects and may be difficult to es-
tablish in a riparian state such as Kentucky. Therefore , 
the third approach seems to be the most promising one. 
Properly conceived, a water allocation framework involving 
state regulation under a permit system will combine many 
of the best aspects of both riparianism and prior approp-
riation while avoiding many of the undesirable features 
of these systems. 
While it is not possible at present to propose 
draft legislation, 1the remainder of this section will 
examine some of the features a well-designed water all-
ocation system should have and suggest ways in which 
Kentucky's existing water rights legislation might be 
improved. Such a system would advance the interests of 
the coal conversion industry by i~proving the efficiency 
of the state's entire water allocation system. The re-
sulting reduction of waste and the stabilization of water 
rights would hopefully make more water available for pro-
ductive uses, thus benefiting both the coal conversion 
industry and other private water users. 
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A Proposed System of Water Allocation 
water Resources Planning 
comprehensive planning, which is essential to a 
nd water resources policy, 2 requires adequate legis-
ive autho;i:oity, sufficient financial support and an 
.il'ctive administrative structure. 
Administrative Structure 
Ideally, planning responsibility should be concen-
3 
within a single agency. This objective, is 
realized in practice, however, because of the large 
of federal, state and local governmental agencies 
lved in water-related activities. It may be more 
listic, therefore, to avoid unnecessary fragmentation 
duplication of planning effort while providing mech-
Jms for coordination in those areas where planning 
nsibility is apportioned among several agencies or 
In Kentucky, planning authority, as in most states, 
dispersed among various instrumentalities of 
local government. At the state level the De-
nt for Natural Resources and Environmen.tal Pro-
planning responsibilities. 4 
r, both the Water Resources Authority5 and the 
r' b' 6 s ca inet also possess planning power in the 
resources area. At the local level numerous public 
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organizations have a limited planning function associated 
with their respective water resource development activit· , ies, __ 
These include drainage, levee and reclamation districts,7 
' 
soil and water conservation districts; 8 watershed con-
servancy districts, 9 flood control districts, 10 and water 
d . t . t 11 is ric s. Furthermore, municipal and county planning 
units are authorized under the state zoning enabling act 
t d t 1 . 12 o o wa er resources panning. Finally, planning by 
federal agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer8 13 
14 
or the Environmental Protection Agency may have a 
significant impact on the water resources of this state. 
Despite the plethora of institutions with planning 
powers in Kentucky, some coherence is nonetheless achieved 
in the planning process by both formal and informal pro-
visions for coordination. Federal agencies, usually work 
closely with their counterparts at the state level. Often 
15 
such coordination is required by statute, but even in 
the absence of such provisions, cooperation on an informal 
basis no doubt occurs. On the state level, the Department 
for Natural Resources supervises many aspects of local 
water resource planning. The Depqrtment, for example, 
may study and review all reports concerning or affecting 
water related projects within the state which are proposed 
for construction for federal, state or local governmental 
agencies. 16 In addition, the Department may review pro-
posals for any project which 
funds in the construction or 
involves the use of state 
f nood. maintenance of works or 
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17 
or water development purposes. Finally, 
;J;.governmental bodies (and private individuals) 
permit from the Department before they 
any dam, embankment, levee, dike, bridge, 
other obstruction across or along any stream. 18 
it seems that the Department may prevent local 
resource development agencies from acting con-
to its own policies. 
e relationship between the Department and the 
Resources Authority is not clearly defined in 
cky's water resources statute. The Department's 
ing responsibilities are rather explicitly defined 
19 
e statute. Its regulatory powers over consump-
d ' d 20 11 . water uses an impoun ments as we as its super-
local public water development agencies 
large staff all suggest that it should 
primary water resources planning agency in the 
The Secretary of Natural Resources and Environ-
Protection is a member of the Water Resources 
d . t . h . 22 an is vice-c airman. This contact be-
n the two agencies would allow at least some form 
The Water Resources Authority, appears to be 
tily concerned with the financing, rather than 
planning of state and local water resource develop-
projects.23 Nevertheless, the Water Resources 
rity is authorized "to coordinate the programs of 
',i 
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all state agencies in the conservation, development 
and wise use of public water," 24 and to "promote the 
beneficial and proper distribution of water through-
out the Commonwealth." 25 Moreover, the Authority has 
explicit power to engage in water development planning26 
and maintains some supervisory authority over the De-
27 partment. 
It appears that most of the actual planning is 
carried on by the Department subject to some oversight 
by the Water Resources Authority. This arrangement may 
be a satisfactory one, but the relationship between these 
agencies with respect to water resources planning should 
be defined more specifically in the statute. 
2. The Planning Process 
The planning process involves the formulation of 
goals and objectives, the establishment of priorities, 
the acquisition of data and the development of imple-
mentation procedures and strategies. The planning pro-
cess may also be divided into developmental and allocative 
elements. Developmental planning is concerned with in-
' 
creasing the available water supply in a particular area 
by reducing evaporation and run off or by promoting the 
transfer of water from another region. This aspect of 
water resources planning usually involves the location 
and design of physical structures such as levees, dikes, 
dams and reservoirs. The Kentucky statute authorizes such 
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by both the Department for Natural Resources 
' 
28 db th vironmental Protect:i.on an y e Water Resources 
planning must also deal with pro-
water allocation. Just as zoning and other 
controls must be made in accordance with a 
30 plan, so also must consumptive use 
., tions, such as those suggested below, be based 
titutionalized planning. Regulation should be 
, not as an end in itself, but as a means of im-
planning process. A system of consumptive 
use permits coordinated with a program of compre-
planning is the most effective means of imple-
the state's planning objective and of directing 
1 1 d 1 . 31 a ong p anne :i.nes. 
Ideally, each of the elements of the planning pro-
should be described in some detail by the legis-
and further supplemented by administrative reg-
ons.32 Furthermore, it may be desirable to re-
a specific document, known as a state water 
Florida has adopted this approach, 33 which 
the Model Water Code. 34 
Consumptive Use Permits 
As the discussion in chapter 4 indicated, there 
number of weaknesses in Kentucky's existing 
permit system. In fact it is doubtful whether 
"''i:iresent regulatory structure could be used effect-
to implement planning decisions. Accordingly, a 
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number of suggestions have been made below to remedy 
this deficiency. 
(a) Exemptions 
Arguably Kentucky's present regulatory framework 
is not comprehensive enough to permit the allocation of 
water resources on a truly rational basis. The definition 
of "public waters," which includes both surface and ground 
water, 35 is broad enough, 36 but the regulatory scheme 
is undermined by a variety of use exemption categories. 
(i) Existing Uses 
The constitutional implications of water resources 
regulation by the state have been examined elsewhere 
in this study. Some states have attempted to avoid or 
at least minimize the substantive due process issue by 
exempting presently-exercised riparian rights from reg-
ualtion. Existing users may be exempted entirely, 37 
given a preferential right to a permit, 38 or required 
to obtain a permit only when their present use is in-
creased.39 Other states, such as Florida40 and Iowa, 41 
regulate existing water users in the same manner as 
new users. k 1 1 . . 42 d Kentuc ya so regu at~s existing users an 
this practice should be maintained. 
(ii) Exempted Use Categories 
Kentucky exempts a substantial number of water use 
categories from regulation, 43 as do many other states.
44 
Generally this is undesirable. Not only does this prac-
tice undermine the effectiveness of the state's water 
169 
tion policy, but it may lead to conflicts between 
water users. In particular, 
the water use permit right may be com-
existence of a large number of unreg-
. 45 46 Domestic and other small users may 
pted for reasons of economy or administrative 
but other users should be subject to 
Geographical Limitations 
"~entucky' s water use regulations are applied on a 
basis. Some states, however, regulate water 
in those areas where serious water resource 
47 developed. This approach has merit 
it permits the state to act where a response 
ded but avoids unnecessary regulation. This 
h seems particularly suited to a state where 
water supply problems are likely to be 
rather than state-wide in nature. Another 
se is to proceed, as Florida has done, on a reg-
Under the Florida Water Resources Act of 
is divided into f~ve water management 
and consumptive use regulations vary from 
district in accordance with the supply and 
pattern of each area. One of these forms of 
regulation might be desirable in Ken-
coal conversion facilities are concentrated 
few water courses instead of being widely 
sed throughout the state, 
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(b) Specificity of Water Right 
One advantage of the permit system over common-law 
riparianism is that consumptive use rights may be clear-
ly defined in terms of quantity, place of withdrawal, 
place of use and so forth. Kentucky's present water 
use regulations conform to this desirable p:rr.active. 49 
(c) Beneficial use 
The encouragement of productive uses and the pre-
vention of waste are important objectives of any system 
of water allocation. This principle is embodied in the 
terms "reasonable use" and "beneficial use." Neverthe-
less, it appears that something more than economic 
efficiency is involved in the distributi?ri of water 
rights. Water rights in the West, 50 and under some 
51 
eastern permit systems, are based on a finding of 
beneficial use. Although this term is not always 
legislatively defined, it seems that it functions as 
a threshold standard. A proposed use is either beneficial 
or wasteful; beneficial uses are permitted while wasteful 
or nonbeneficial ones are not. Rarely does a water reg-
ulatory agency attempt to characterize one use as "more 
beneficial" than another for purposes of allocating water 
rights even though an economist might be able to measure 
the relative efficiency of the respective uses. In other 
words, beneficial use is an absolute rather than a relative 
standard and, therefore, provides little help in disting-
uishing among various alternative water uses. Consequent-
. tiOll ly, consumptive use permits, under both prior appropria · 
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non-riparian jurisdictions, are usually awarded 
lfirst-come, first served'' basis as long as the pro-
. f. . 152 
use is bene icia d t ' 'l bl 53 an wa er is avai a e. 
tucky, a permit must be granted for a "useful pur-
The term "beneficial use" is used elsewhere 
55 statute, but is not defined. Nevertheless, it 
that beneficial use is the basis of permit rights 
Therefore, it is recommended that the term 
ined and explicitly incorporated into the regulatory 
of Water Right 
of water allocation must strike a balance 
and flexibility. This problem arises in 
with fixing the length of time for which a per-
be granted. A system of water rights based on 
of perpetual duration, like the prior appropriation 
m of the West, may suffer from problems of excessive 
ity. 57 If a permit period is too short, however, 
istment in long-term facilities may be discouraged. 58 
regulatory proposals provide for permits of specific 
59 These range from a ten-year maximum in Iowa, 
fifty-year maximum under the Model Water Use Act. 60 
e present time permits of indefinite duration are 
This is undesirable. A durational 
some sort should be placed on the issuance of all 
The time period allowed should bear some reason-
relationship to the projected duration of the intended 
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enterprise. In the case of coal conversion, a permit of 
fifty year's or more duration may be necessary to insure 
that the original investment is full amortized. 
(e) Locational Use Limitations 
Locational use limitations are among the most serious 
weaknesses of the riparian system. 61 Nevertheless, a sur-
prising number of statutory water allocation systems fail 
to treat these matters very explicitly. 62 In Kentucky, 
for example, nothing is said about whether a nonriparian 
bt . t' . 63 can o ain a consump ive use permit. Use beyond the 
watershed, is expressly authorized if the permission of 
the Water Resources Authority is obtained. 64 
In prior appropriation jurisdictions, of course, such 
uses are allowed as a matter of right if the proposed use 
is otherwise qualified. This position also prevails in 
Florida65 and would seem to be the better approach. The 
agency should not distinguish between riparian and non-
riparian applicants and transportation beyond the water-
shed should be allowed unless it can be shown that existing 
users would be adversely affected. 
(f) Reallocation Mechanisms 
Since the beneficial use standard does not distinguish 
among water uses on the basis of economic efficiency, the 
initial allocation pattern will almost certainly fail to 
achieve maximum productive use of the resource. In other 
words, once the available water supply has been allocated 
to permittees by the regulatory agency, a net increase in 
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occur if water within the system is re-
less productive uses to more productive 
This feature would be important to the coal 
industry, as well as other industrial users, 
uses will usually be more productive than 
ltural uses. This reallocation may be accomplished 
her market or nonmarket mechanisms. 
Transfers 
other things being equal, the market is probably 
resource allocation mechanism than an administrative 
67 Resource allocation decisions are seldom made by 
means in the United States except where the 
cannot allocate efficiently (or no market exists 
) 68 or where distributional or other considerations 
re important than efficiency goals. 69 Unfortunate-
se conditions often occur where water resources 
Because of the nature of water, changes in 
or location of use sometimes adversely affect 
These conditions may be regarded as negative 
If the costs to other users are not 
into account by the transacting parties, an in-
of resources may result (at least 
ciety's point of view). 70 In order to prevent this 
curring, some restrictions on voluntary transfers 
necessary. At the present time the Kentucky statute 
ent on the issue of transferability. Instead of ig-
the problem, a better approach would be to allow 
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such transfers to occur, but also to subject them to 
administrative review in order to protect the interest of 
other users and the public. 71 
(ii) Involuntary Transfers 
Transaction costs or other factors sometimes pre-
vent water users from effecting a more efficient allocation 
72 
of the resource by means of voluntary transfers. In 
such cases it may be desirable to allow one user to acquire 
a water right from another user by condemnation. Munici-
palities and other public bodies often possess such 
The power of eminent domain, including the power to condemn 
water rights, has also been given in many states to public 
utilities and other private corporations affected with the 
bl . . t 74 pu ic in erest. Arguably such power could be given to 
coal conversion facilities. In fact, coal conversion dev-
elopment and demonstration projects in Kentucky currently 
possess explicit statutory authority to acquire water rights 
h h h . f . d . 75 t roug t e exercise o eminent omain. If this power 
were extended to commercial coal conversion facilities 
generally, it would allow them to obtain additional water 
supplies as their operations expanded in the future. 
Of course it may be unwise to single out one enter-
prise for preferential treatment since this smacks of 
"special interest" legislation. The use of a preference 
system may provide a suitable compromise. Under this 
approach, found in some prior appropriation jurisdictions, 
a system of statutory preference categories is created 
175 
water user in a high preference category to con-
water right of a water user in a lower preference 
If this approach were adopted in Kentucky 
rial users, including coal conversion facilities, 
1d occupy a high preference category, perhaps below 
•:that of municipal water supply and recreational uses. 
Renewal Applications 
·. Many permit systems in the East contain procedures 
the renewal of a permit, 77 although some states, such 
ntucky, ignore the matter entirely. Moreover, even 
e renewal is mentioned, no state, with the exception of 
ida, 78 deals effectively with the problem of competing 
ications where one of the parties is a renewal applicant. 79 
is the stage at which the regulatory system can most 
tly promote a particular water use pattern. As long 
e available water supplies are ample it is difficult 
ny a permit to any applicant whose proposed use meets 
... beneficial use standard. On the other hand, when there 
enough water to go around, some applicants must be 
a permit. In such situations, contests between re-
1 applicants and initial applicants are bound to occur. 
enewal applicant would have a strong equitable claim 
ain his water right, but the other applicants might 
st for more productive uses. A system that is effi-
-oriented would require that the more productive use 
However, since beneficial use is an absolute 
than a compariative standard, one use cannot be 
beneficial than another.. One approach is to 
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use preference categories. For example, the regulatory 
scheme may provide that where competing applications are 
made before the agency it shall prefer industrial uses 
agricultural uses (or vice versa). A better approach, 
however, would be to favor in such circumstances the 
applicant whose proposed use best conforms to the state 
use plan. In theory, the renewal applicant, if he is dis-
placed by the new applicant, has not been treated unreason 
since his original investment has been fully amortized 
over the period of his initial permit. However, the reg-
ulatory system could properly require the new water user 
to pay some compensation to the displaced user such as re-
l . 80 ocation expenses. 
(g) Temporary Water Shortage 
Kentucky, like most states, 81 fails to provide an 
adequate mechanism for allocating water during periods of 
water shortage. Kentucky's approach is essentially crisis-
reactive and does little to prevent a crisis condition 
from arising in the first place. 82 Advance planning for 
periods of water shortage seems more productive. As part 
of this planning process, the regulatory agency should adopt 
a system of permit classification according to source of 
supply, method of extraction or diversion, use of water, 
some combination of these factors. 83 This plan will be 
implemented upon declaration of the water shortage and 
remain in effect until the agency rescinded its declaration 
of water shortage. 84 Since restrictions on water use would 
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on a class basis, individual permit users 
some advance idea of their relative priority 
shortage. 
Recommendations 
Although this study is primarily concerned with the 
ected water needs of coal conversion facilities (should 
al conversion industry develop in this state), it is 
icult and probably undesirable to isolate this problem 
the broader issue of water rights generally. A system 
rights which couples comprehensive planning with a 
and effective regulatory policy will benefit all 
including the coal conversion industry. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the Legislature consider 
rehensive revision of KRS chapter 151 in the near 
The existing statute can be improved by (1) clar-
g the planning functions of the Department for Natural 
rces and Environmental Protection and the Water Resources 
rity; (2) expanding the scope of the consumptive use 
it system by removing most of the exempted use categories; 
adopting beneficial use as the basis upon which consump-
permits will be granted; ,(4) imposing a durational 
water use permits and delineating renewal procedures; 
scheme for both voluntary and involuntary 
of water rights; and (6) specifying more explicit 
for dealing with temporary water shortages. 
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signed to deal with long-term or permanent water shortage 
conditions. 
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APPENDIX 
State Water Use Plan 
Florida Statutes §373.036 (1974) 
The department shall proceed as rapidly as 
to study existing water resources in the state; 
and methods of conserving and augmenting such waters; 
ing and contemplated needs and uses of water for pro-
and procreation of fish and wildlife, irrigation, 
power development, and domestic, municipal, and 
trial uses; and all other related subjects, including 
age, reclamation, flood-plain or flood-hazard area 
g, and selection of reservoir sites. The department 
cooperate with the division of state planning of the 
of administration, or its successor agency, pro-
to formulate, as a functional element of a com-
state plan, an integrated, coordinated plan for 
and development of the waters of the state, based 
above studies. This plan, with such amendments, 
ements and additions as may be necessary from time 
shall be known as the state water use plan. 
In the formulation of the state water use plan, 
,&epartment shall give due consideration to: 
The attainment of maximum reasonable-beneficial 
for such purposes as those referred to in sub-
The maximum economic development of the water re-
es consistent with other uses. 
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(c) The control of such waters for such purposes 
as environmental protection, drainage, flood control, and 
water storage. 
(d) The quantity of water available for application 
to a reasonable-beneficial use. 
(e) The prevention of wasteful, uneconomical, im-
practical, or unreasonable uses of water resources. 
(f) Presently exercised domestic use and permit 
rights. 
(g) The preservation and enhancement of the water 
quality of the state and the provisions of the state 
water quality plan. 
(h) The state water resources policy as expressed 
by this chapter. 
(3) During the process of formulating or revising 
the state water use plan, the department shall consult 
with, and carefully evaluate the recommendations of, con-
cerned federal, state, and local agencies, particularly 
the governing boards of the water management districts, 
and other interested persons. 
(4) Each governing board is directed to cooperate 
with the department in conducting surveys and 
of water resources, to furnish the department with all a-
vailable data of a technical nature, and to advise and 
assist the department in the formulation and drafting of 
those portions of the state plan applicable to the 
(5) The department shall not adopt or modify the 
state water use plan or any portion thereof without first· 
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a public hearing on the matter. At least ninety 
advance of such hearing, the department shall 
any affected governing boards, and shall give notice 
by publication within the affected region 
provisions of chapter 129, except such 
by publication shall be extended at least ninety 
in advance of such hearings. 
For the purposes of this plan the department 
n.consultation with the affected governing board, 
each water management district into sections which 
conform as nearly as practicable to hydrologically 
areas and describe all water resources within 
The department shall give careful consideration 
e requirements of public recreation and to the pro-
n and procreation of fish and wildlife. The de-
nt may prohibit or restrict other future uses on 
·n designated bodies of water which may be inconsis-
these objectives. 
The department may designate certain uses in 
tion with a particular source of supply which, be-
of the nature of the activity or the amount of water 
would constitute an undesirable use for which the 
board may deny a permit. 
The department may designate certain uses in 
tion with a particular source of supply which, be-
of the nature of the activity or the amount of water 
in an enhancement or improvement of 
Ii I 
I 
I 
I 
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the water resources of the area. Such uses shall be Pre-
ferred over other uses in the event of competing applicat 
under the permitting systems authorized by this chapter. 
(10) The department, in cooperation with the 
division of state planning of the department of adminis-
tration, or its successor agency, may add to the state 
water use plan any other information, directions, or 
objectives it deems necessary or desirable for the guidan 
of the governing boards or other agencies in the admin-
istration and enforcement of this chapter. 
